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I. INTRODUCTION 
Peru is a country of many contrasts, contrasts among 
people found on the streets, in the weather within a radius 
of 20 kilometers, in the geography, in the economic condi­
tions of its population and in the levels of education. An 
economic study of any aspect of Peru' has to take these 
characteristics into consideration. It would be misleading 
to advance generalized concepts about the country as a whole 
without some understanding of its heterogeneity. 
Peri/ is classified among the countries with a per-capita 
national income less than US$250.00 by the United Nations (50). 
According to Higgins (19)j underdeveloped countries are those 
having twenty-five percent or less of the United States' per-
capita national income. Peru'' is an underdeveloped country 
according to both measures. This concept of underdevelopment 
is only a relative estimation of a country's economic condi­
tions, Development is a dynamic concept and implies change 
toward an improvement of present conditions. Improvement 
implies a goal. The Identification of the goals and the rate 
of movement towards them are two important elements of develop­
ment. 
Articulation of goals is difficult since preferences of 
all citizens living in the nation should be considered. Yet, 
the goals of Peruvians are extremely diverse and frequently 
in conflict. However, the economic development goal represents 
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preferences officially held by the Peruvian nation as arti­
culated in 1) the Charter of Punta del Este (27), 2) Peru's 
National Plan of Economic and Social Development 1962-1971 (3) i  
and 3) the decree establishing the National Planning Institute 
(34). Also officially held is the end-in-view of agricultural 
improvement as a major means toward economic development of 
the nation as stated in the above three references and 
emphasized in decrees establishing the Institute of Agrarian 
Reform and Colonization (31,  32,  33) .  
Since approximately 60 percent of the nation's people 
live and work in the agricultural sector, development of this 
sector is crucial in the development of Peru. This is true 
both in terms of agricultural productivity contribution to 
national development and of consumer demand generated within 
the agricultural sector for industrial products and services,. 
Existing structures within agriculture are recognized as major 
impediments to economic development both within agriculture 
and within the nation. 
This study inquires into conditions as found in the 
Sierra region where structures within agriculture appear to 
be inhibiting economic development, social improvement and 
stability of the country. It is limited to the study of two 
farms purposely drawn to depict conditions of relatively good 
and relatively poor productivity. In analyzing these two 
farms the study endeavors to analyze existing productivity 
and structures. As a result of the analysis certain 
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improvements in existing conditions are suggested which would 
contribute to economic development, social improvement and 
political stability. 
A. Agrarian Reform and Economic Development 
Economic development is a dynamic process and implies 
significant changes in structures as well as adjustments in 
allocation of resources, leading to the attainment of the 
ends-in-view of people. The development process may be 
measured in part, by the rate of growth of the gross national 
product (GNP) and the GNP per-capita. These indices are 
useful for comparative purposes in designing a plan for 
development. In 1962, Peru submitted a national plan for 
economic and social development in accordance with the Charter 
of Punta del Este (27). In this plan an annual gross national 
product rate of 5.9 percent Increase was the end-in-view fixed 
for a ten-year period. In order to meet this growth rate, 
agricultural production for internal consumption should yield 
an annual growth of 7.7 percent and agricultural production 
for export should yield an annual growth of 6.6 percent. The 
above growth targets can be compared with growth conditions 
for the period 1950-1960. During this decade the annual gross 
national product increased 3.7 percent, agricultural production 
for internal consumption 1.3 percent and export agricultural 
production 5.8 percent. Therefore, the gap between the growth 
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rate objectives as stated in the ten year plan and the growth 
rates experienced during the 1950's, is an annual increase of 
2.2 percent for the gross national product, 6.4 percent for 
the agricultural production for internal consumption and 0.8 
percent increase for the export agricultural production. 
This gap must be removed if the national norm is to be 
achieved. 
Population increased from 8,673.9 thousand people in 
1950 to 11,027.0 thousand people in I96O, while national 
product increased from 15,148.3 million soles to 21,807.8 
million. Consequently the per-capita rate of increase in 
GNP was 1.17 percent. The end-in-view of 5.9 percent in­
crease in total GNP is equivalent to 2.74 increase of GNP 
per-capita if population continued its 3 percent rate of 
increase. Therefore, the gap between the end-in-view stated 
in the plan and the existing situation would be an increase 
of 1.57 percent per-capita. 
While the expected growth rates within the agricultural 
sector might appear excessive in relation to expected growth 
rates of other sectors and in light of experiences in other 
developing nations, this study refers to these rates as a 
guide in illustrating both the rate of growth expected in 
agriculture and the magnitude of the gap to be closed between 
this expected growth and the rate experienced in the recent past. 
Since 60 percent of the labor force is engaged in 
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agriculture, the development of the agricultural sector 
is important for the development of the country. Also, 58 
percent of the total population lives in the Sierra most of 
whom work in agriculture. Unfortunately neither production 
nor contribution to GNP data are available for recent years 
by regions. Consequently, neither total nor per-capita GNP 
data can be given for the Sierra. However, the Sierra region 
contributes 38 percent of the national income and its per-
capita income is about 70 percent that of the nation and 
about one-third of the per-capita income reached in the 
Coastal region. These data indicate the severity of under­
development in the Sierra with which this study is chiefly 
concerned. 
To attain the economic development goal, policy makers 
must design their policies according to a given strategy. 
Strategy is defined as a plan for economic development using 
a given stratagem or a clearly contrived scheme. According 
to the crieteria of certain authors including Hirschman (20) 
and Rostow (38), strategy varies with the present status of 
development. Initially, and with specified goals in mind 
strategy proceeds with changes in those structures which are 
impeding development. 
In analyzing structures, we must differentiate between 
changes in instruments and structures. Both ai-e considered 
as variables in the change process and are subject to public 
intervention in the interest of economic development. 
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Instruments are used to make small and frequent changes 
within and between various sectors and are within the control 
of administrators and managers. However, the use of instru­
ments in changing tax rates, interest rates, capital invest­
ments and wage rates, for example, assumes that the structures 
have been fashioned which permit the exercise of tne instru­
ments. In more developed countries instruments constitute the 
main policy means used for stimulating economic development. 
However, in the less developed countries structures are not 
yet developed to provide the policy maker with the instruments 
which he may use in economic development. For example, the 
agrarian structures in the Sierra of Peri/ remain largely 
feudal in nature and have resisted change over the past four 
centuries. Ownership systems follow with some modifications 
either the structures found in the Inca empire at the tirae 
of the Spanish Conquest in the 1530's or the structures the 
Spanish established using the model of the feudal systems of 
Spain in the XVI century or some combination of both. Thus 
structures regulating the control and allocation of resources 
with a l6th century orientation are not conducive to the 
development of entrepreneurship and the use of modern tech­
nology required in the process of economic development of the 
region. 
Following the United Nations reasoning, structures are 
defined in this report as those institutions through whi^h group 
action affects individual choice and action with respect 
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to resource use. Through the structures individual choice 
and action may be liberated, expanded or restrained (42, 44). 
Agrarian structures are defined by the United Nations 
(48) as the institutional framework of agricultural pro­
duction. It includes in the first place, land tenure, the 
legal and customary system under which land is owned; the 
distribution of ownership of farm property between large 
estates and peasant farms or among peasant farms of various 
sizes; land tenancy, the system under which land is operated 
and its product divided between operator and owner; the 
organization of credit, production and marketing; the 
mechanism through which agriculture is financed; the burdens 
imposed on rural populations by governments in the form of 
taxation; and the services supplied by governments to rural 
populations, such as technical advice and educational 
facilities, health services, water supply and communications. 
Changes in structures affect essential relationships among 
Individuals in the use of resources as well as the levels and 
distribution of income resulting from resource use. If these 
changes correct faulty and defective institutions by intro­
ducing means which help achieve the target variables, they 
are termed reforms in this study. 
In light of existing structures and level of economic 
development, it would appear that reforms are required as part 
of the preconditions for the take-off stage of development in 
major parts of the agriculture sector, particularly in the 
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Sierra. This Is the reason why the Charter of Punta del 
Este (27) has encouraged participating countries to plan and 
carry out "Integral agrarian reforms" within an Integrated 
economic development plan for the Individual country. 
In addition to enhancing productivity of resources and 
distribution of Income, agrarian reforms are also expected 
to help maintain a minimal level of political stability which 
will accommodate orderly structural change leading to economic 
and social development. This level of political stability 
contrasted with stagnation constitutes one of the necessary 
conditions for economic development. Agrarian reform has 
frequently been used as an Instrument of politics to satisfy 
the Interests of a given system or a given group of people 
endangering the maintenance of the stability threshold. It 
is Important to correct this tendency and to use agrarian 
reforms as means to improve the development of the nation and 
its people as a whole while maintaining that minimal level of 
political stability necessary for economic progress. 
B. The Problem and its Setting 
Economic development Is conditioned by many factors 
retarding or accelerating its rate. Factors retarding its 
rate will be called failure elements and factors accelerating 
it will be called success elements. Failure and success 
elements may be found at various levels of aggregation of 
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policy making such as the national, regional, community and 
farm levels. The failure elements contribute to the problem 
and the success elements contribute to its solution at each 
aggregational level. Following is a discussion of problems 
at national. Sierra regional, community and farm levels. 
1. Development problems at the national level 
The main development problems nationally appear to 
consist of a) low levels of productivity, b) inadequate 
distribution of income, and c) political unrest. 
a. Low levels of productivity Peruvians have a 
very low productivity,, The data supporting this statement 
are adjusted to 1950 constant prices. Prices increased 
approximately 255 percent from 1950 to I961 (Table 1) 
according to Wholesale Prices (30). 
Gross national product (hereafter called GNP) increased 
from 100 to l44 between 1950 and i960, using an index where 
100 equaled 15,148.3 million soles in 1950 (Table 2). 
However, this increase was erratic. From 1958 to 1959, 
GNP decreased from an index of 135.1 to 134.3 or 1,072.3 
million soles. There was another decrease in 1953-4 to an 
index of ll6.4. 
Population data from Renta Nacional (4,5) reveal that 
per-capita contribution to the GNP in 1950 was S/ 1,746.00, 
while in 1960 it was S/ 1,891.00. Annual increases of GNP 
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per-capita ranged from 4.6 index points during 1954 to 6.8 
index points during 1955 (index number 100=1,746 soles in 
1950) with an annual average increase of 5.7 index points 
for the two years. 
b. Inadequate distribution of Income Unfortunately 
there are no data available showing the distribution of 
income by sectors. However, an indication of income distri­
bution may be obtained by examining the contribution of each 
sector to the GNP and by oserved ownership patterns. The 
highest per-capita contribution to GNP was made by finances 
with 34,066 soles (Table 3), while the lowest was made by 
agriculture with 2,944 soles. Peru's population may be 
divided into three main social classes; the lower, the middle, 
and the higher classes. These classes are divided mainly 
by the amount of wealth and income they possess. This is 
evidenced in agriculture by 1.6 percent of the farmers 
owning 76.2 percent of the cultivated area while 59.5 per­
cent of the farmers own only 0.9 percent of the cultivated 
area (13). The average farm size of the first group is 
larger than one thousand hectares while the second group has 
an average size smaller than five hectares. 
The higher class is characterized by owners of the 
haciendas and other wealthy people. The middle class is 
formed by owners of smaller farms, professional people and 
white collar workers. Usually the lower class people do not 
own any real estate. This fact is important especially if 
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the structure is so rigid from the social mobility point of 
view that few people with "humble background can expect to 
rise to positions of high responsibility, no matter what 
their efforts and ability" as pointed out by Whyte (51). 
c. Political unrest The country is passing through 
a period of political unrest manifested in many types of 
actions impeding the development of the country and the 
work of people in agriculture and in industry. Rioters claim 
their unrest is due to low income and feudal land tenure 
practices. This is observed especially within the agri­
cultural sector. The population of Peru is demanding re­
forms in order that the "oppressed people" may work on their 
own lands, instead of working for others at uncertain wages 
and below their productivity potential as will be shown 
later in this report. 
2. Agricultural problems within the Sierra 
Throughout the Sierra region with which this study is 
concerned, a major problem is the shortage of cultivable 
land. Stated conversely, there is unemployment and under­
employment of people in agriculture. This contributes to a 
very low marginal value productivity of labor and extremely 
low consumption levels. Since the majority of the nation's 
labor force works in agriculture, this low productivity 
creates a negligible demand for non-agricultural products. 
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The situation calls for Increased productivity of existing 
agriculture, development of more agricultural areas and for 
mobility of labor from agriculture to other sectors on a 
national development path. Feudal land tenure structures 
as found in the Sierra do not permit most Peruvians to 
accumulate capital. These structures also lead to con­
centration of capital. Deficient structures also encourage 
the non-Indian Peruvians to discriminate against the 
Indians. Frequently, Indians are thought to be unable to 
learn or to make decisions or to perform jobs other than 
physical labor. 
The 19^0 data (the most recent available data) Indicate 
that almost 53 percent of the nation's population was 
white, or "mestiza" , and around 47 percent v^as Indian 
(Table 4). The main criterion in classifying the population 
as Indian was the literacy level. Therefore, this 47 per­
cent is an indication of the level of illiteracy of the 
Peruvian population. 
Table 4 Indicates distribution of Indian population for 
three important Departamentos of the South Sierra of Peru 
as compared with Lima which is located on the coast. In 
Puno, Cuzco and Ayacucho, the Indian population varies from 
71 percent to 92 percent of the total, indicating that the 
illiteracy rate in these Departamentos is extremely high, 
while in Lima the Indian population is only 15 percent. 
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3. Agricultural problems at the community and farm level 
Before discussing the problems, let us examine briefly 
the environments where agricultural laborers live at the 
community and farm levels in the Peruvian Sierra. Laborers 
work in haciendas or in Communidades Indigenas. Haciendas 
are constituted usually by land belonging to a given person 
or institution encompassing a community of laborers who live 
there and have an obligation to.work for the owner during a 
given period as part or total payment for the land they are 
grazited for cultivation or pasture. However, Indians are 
usually paid a wage, either in kind or in money, in addition 
to the land they cultivate or pasture. Communidades 
Indigenas are constituted by people living on a given area 
of land who have blood ties and work the land of the 
community as a group or individually. Some of the Communidades 
Indigenas are recognized by the government and given some 
help to keep them together as a community. This type of 
arrangement has been inherited from the Inca period. 
These two environments can be considered communities 
because both are formed by groups of individuals who work 
and live as a group. The main problems arising within the 
Indian communities are especially due to the low productive 
lands, the small size of the units for cultivation due in 
part to population growth, the lack of knowledgeable leader­
ship and management, and the lack of capital and technology. 
A very important problem is the existence of disguised 
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unemployment and redundant laborers especially due to lack 
of employment outside agriculture. 
It is important to understand that problems in the 
hacienda type of holding can be divided according to level 
of aggregation into community and farm. The community 
problems refer to the problems faced by the hacienda as a 
whole including the owner and the Indians living on the 
hacienda. The farm level problems refer to the problems 
faced by the Indians as individuals working on the plots 
they are given for cultivation under feudal patterns. The 
problems at the farm level are acute especially because 
very often the lands Indians cultivate are not sufficient 
for feeding their families. The condition generates 
serious dissatisfactions among the Indians. 
The instabilities and dissatisfactions of Indians 
working in agriculture, together with other political move­
ments, brought about the creation of the Institute de 
Reforma Agraria y Colonization (hereafter called IRAC) (32). 
The government decided to create IRAC, following 
recommendations of the Comision de Reforma Agraria y la 
Vlvienda. This commission was established in 1957. After 
four years of study, it prepared a proposed law for agrarian 
reform in Pen/ (28). The government presented this law to 
Congress, but it was never debated. 
IRAC was created by Supreme Decree No, 9, June 3, I960 
(32). Supreme Decree No, 1, April 21, I96I (33), extends 
the original provisions. Augmented by Decree Law No. 14238, 
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November l6, 1962 (31), IRAC Is assigned broad responsi­
bilities for development of the nation's agriculture. 
In order for the Institute to work efficiently, it must 
acquire considerable information about the problems it seeks 
to remedy. Since the solution is to come, in part, through 
a change in agricultural and nonagricultural structures, 
IRAC will find it necessary to invent and adapt new 
structures as preconditions to the development of the country. 
This study exemplifies a kind of investigation needed by 
IRAC in identifying and remedying the problems with which the 
Institute is charged, 
C. Objectives of this Study 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
( 1 )  To identify certain failure and success elements 
in the Peruvian Sierra agrarian situation primarily 
through a detailed study of two Sierra farms. 
(2) To analyze economic results in an ex-ante framework 
of a change in structure within Sierra farms, as 
suggested by the farms studied. 
(3) To design a model for the development of the 
agriculture at the farm and community levels with 
special reference to the two Sierra farms. 
(4) To suggest certain changes of structure found in this 
study and to outline further research needs. 
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D. Procedures Used 
A fact finding trip was undertaken through the South 
Sierra of Peru in order to have an over all idea of the 
conditions of the region. A survey of the literature and 
data was also undertaken and government officials were 
contacted to determine the problems and the scope of the 
study. Since we could not find a population from which to 
draw a sample, the case study approach was selected. 
Possible areas of study were selected taking into con­
sideration density of population. Income of the people, 
physical characteristics of the region, and other relevant 
factors. Two haciendas were selected from the ^ontinium 
found in order to depict a highly productive Sierra hacienda 
and an unproductive hacienda. A survey of the Distrito where 
the haciendas were located was undertaken to compare the 
conditions of the selected haciendas in relation to the 
other Distrito's haciendas. 
The Cuzco hacienda is divided into two main section 
which will be called the core hacienda and the annex. Each 
of the sections constitutes a different community. Both 
the core hacienda and the annex laborers are given plots of 
land for cultivation and pasture by the owner of the Cuzco 
hacienda. In return they work on the owner's lands. The 
study of this hacienda Includes the study of the hacienda 
as a whole which is considered as two communities governed 
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by the owner and the study of the individual Indians at the 
farm level to estimate their income, forms of cultivation 
and the structures regulating their work and productivity. 
The Ayacucho Farm constitutes only one community 
governed mainly by Indian authorities under the control of 
the owner who is an absentee owner. The Ayacucho hacienda 
represents one of the less developed agricultural areas in 
the region with methods of cultivation being poor and 
obsolete. 
The study of the two farms is guided by a policy making 
model developed with the idea of providing a methodology 
to the study of structures found at the farm and community 
levels. One important characteristic of this model is its 
double level of aggregation. The model is first developed 
at the farm level by the study of the structural relationships 
of exogenous variables to attain given target variables. 
The same scheme is developed for the community level. 
There is a link among the levels through the exogenous 
variables. Some of these variables are not policy means 
at farm level; however, they become policy means at the 
community level. Other levels of aggregation beyond the 
community were not studied, but there is no reason why a 
comprehensive study from the farm through the regional and 
national levels may not be pursued. 
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E. Plan of this Report 
Following this initial section, the next or second 
section elaborates a model for the development of agriculture 
at the farm and community levels. The third section con­
tinues with case studies of the two farms in the Andean 
region of Peru. The fourth section proceeds to explore the 
possibilities of reform of structures found in the two farms 
at both farm and community levels. The fifth section 
summarizes the report and suggests areas of research for 
future studies. 
Additional data to support the statements in the text 
are presented in the appendix. 
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II. A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AT THE 
FARM AND COMMUNITY LEVELS 
This section develops a policy making model^ which 
could be used by researchers concerned with economic develop­
ment at various levels of aggregation. It is assumed that 
research would be carried out with the objective of esti­
mating the consequences of the application of certain 
policy means under given circumstances. The model is adapted 
to the conditions found in the Sierra region and applied in 
the analysis of two haciendas, the Ayacucho and the Cuzco 
haciendas. 
Professor Tinbergen (48) defines economic policy as 
follows: 
By "economic policy" certain acts of economic behavior 
are indicated. In its broadest sense therefore the 
phrase includes the whole subject matter of economic 
theory. This is particularly true with regard to the 
"economic policy" of individuals or individual firms. 
This economic policy is directed towards the maximiza­
tion of the ordinary ophelimity functions. In a 
narrower sense we may restrict the meaning of the term 
"economic policy" to the behavior of organized groups, 
such as trade unions, agricultural or industrial or­
ganizations, etc. Here some collective ophelimity 
function will be the object to be maximized. In its 
most specific and most relevant sense the notion of 
economic policy will, however, refer to governments. 
In this study the term economic policy will be used in 
both its broadest and narrower meanings according to Professor 
Tinbergen, since it is applied to the farm and community 
level. However, it is important to remember that the 
community level policy maker is a form of government and 
could be formalized as such. The various levels of 
aggregation would not change the principles of the theory of 
economic policy, they would merely change the preference 
function and the variables the policy maker is faced with. 
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A. Policy-making Model Applied to the Sierra Region 
In a recent article, Johnston and Mellor (21) divide 
agricultural development into three phases: Phase I, 
development of agricultural preconditions; phase 11, 
expansion of agricultural production based on labor-
intensive, capital saving techniques, relying heavily on 
technological innovations; phase III, expansion of agri­
cultural production based on capital-intensive, labor-
saving techniques. Peru can be classified as being in 
phase I, where pre-conditions are needed for development. 
Johnston and Mellor explain briefly the policies needed to 
provide these pre-conditions with a special emphasis on 
land tenure reforms. 
The articles of Lewis (24) (25), dividing the economy 
into two-sector models, followed by an article by Ranis and 
Pei (37)J provide a framework within which the transition 
from stagnation to self-sustaining growth based especially 
on the agricultural productivity and supply can be analyzed. 
All these attempts to construct an economic development 
theory for the agricultural sector of an underdeveloped 
country are mainly from a theoretical economic point of view. 
However, Thorbecke (41), attempts to relate the economic 
development to the theory or economic policy in order to 
analyze agrarian reforms as means toward economic 
development. He bases his economic policy theory 
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on Tlnbergen's approach (47) (48), who divided the analysis 
into three elements: 1) welfare function, 2) variables, and 
3) specification of a system of structural relationships. 
The model presented in this section will follow these 
guides with certain modifications. It will be divided into 
two policy-making levels. Within each level special atten­
tion is given the preference function and the variables. 
The model encompasses structural relationships of variables 
within and between policy making levels. 
1. Policy-making levels 
Both farm and community policy-making levels are 
included in the model. As applied to Sierra conditions 
the farm level refers to land operated by individuals, mostly 
Indians drawing income from farming it for themselves regard­
less of the ownership of land resources. As an example of 
farm level we may consider the plots of land farmed by 
Indians and given to them for cultivation as part payment 
for work performed at the Ayacucho hacienda as will be 
analyzed later. The community level constitutes a group 
of farmers or household units established in a territory and 
interrelated in such a way, as a unit, that they can influence 
the economic activities as well as the legal relationships of 
each farmer or household. Through its policy maker the 
community exerts a unifying effect upon the members and 
fulfills the functions of social life on its own or in 
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connection with more complex groups. 
At each of the policy-making levels discussed above, 
and with a given planning horizon, the policy maker formu­
lates a preference or welfare function according to pre­
ferences he may have with respect to the elements determining 
the individual welfare, the relationships among individuals 
and other factors that he considers of value. This is 
different for each level of aggregation; however, it will 
be Influenced by the preference or welfare function of 
policy makers at other levels. It may be that the best 
allocation of resources for a group of farms is not the best 
for an individual entrepreneur within that group, or, at a 
higher level of aggregation. What is good for the nation 
may not be best for the group of farms. It is very important 
to make a decision concerning the level of aggregation and 
the level of complementarity and competitiveness of the 
resources at each level. As stated by Tlmmons (45) ,  
Intrafirm and Interfirm problems of land 
use Involve elements of conflict between 
public and private objectives. There is 
an urgent need for defining the comple­
mentarity and competitive ranges of such 
Interest. 
An attempt is made here to differentiate farm and 
community levels so that complementarity and competitive 
ranges of Interest may be evaluated in terms of the objec­
tives of each aggregational policy-making level. 
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2. Variables 
In order to make their decisions, policy makers are 
concerned with the variables found in the economic and 
social system. Variables within each level of aggregation 
may be classified into exogenous and endogenous. The exo­
genous variables or data are the determinants of the 
endogenous variables through the working of the economic 
system. The exogenous would correspond to the independent 
variables and the endogenous to the dependent variables in 
regression analysis, as stated by Fox (l4). Exogenous 
variables may be classified as non-controllable variables 
or controllable variables used as policy means. The endo­
genous variables are classified in terms of side effects 
and target variables. 
The policy maker does not have any influence over the 
non-controllable variables so that he uses the policy means 
in order to induce the target variables toward his pre­
ference function. If the variables are examined at the 
farm and community level we would observe that some of the 
non-controllable variables at the farm level become policy 
means for the community policy maker because he is in control 
of more factors than the farmer. Also, some of the irrele­
vant variables at the farm level may become target variables 
at the community level (Figure 1). 
FARM LEVEL 
DATA OF N0:>;-
CONÏROLLACLE 
FACTORS 
POLICY MEANS 
•C0i7iMUN)TY UNIT LEVEL j,OTHER 
LEVELS 
DATA OF NON -
CONTROLLABLE 
FACTORS 
POLICY MEANS 
SIDE EFFECTS OF 
IRRELEVANT VAXIBL.ES 
TARGET VARIABLES 
SIDE EFFECTS OF 
IRRELLEVANT VARIABLES 
TARGET VARIABLES 
V/ FL *  W. C.U. L.  
Figure 1. Theoretical relationship of policy-making within and 
between policy-making levels 
* Farm level, 
** Community unit level 
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3. Identification and Classification of Variables 
A classification of variables adapted to the conditions 
found in the Sierra is developed which would serve the 
purpose of establishing the status of farmers and commun­
ities as well as of establishing a model for the attain­
ment of the policy makers welfare function through a system 
of structural relationships linking variables. 
The classification may be applied either to the farm 
or to the community level of policy-making. It is assumed 
that the policy maker at the farm level is the head of a 
household as operator of a plot of land, as a wage earner 
or as an unemployed individual. The policy maker at the 
community level could be an individual or a council (elected 
or imposed by the structural system) who makes and enforces 
on the members the rules guiding their lives in common. 
The policy maker will select from the exogenous variables 
his policy means to drive the target variables toward his 
welfare function, 
a. Exogenous variables Exogenous variables will 
be studied in the following order: 1) resources, 2) products 
or activities, 3) variables affecting physical productivity 
of resources, 4) variables affecting price of resources, 
and 5), variables generated in other policy-making levels, 
(l) Resources The first general subdivision 
of resources will be according to ownership or property. 
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The policy maker will be interested in knowing the amount of 
resources he owns in relation to the amount of resources 
owned by others. Ownership will also be a factor in de­
fining the policy-making unit. 
Following is a discussion of the implications of 
ownership. Property is the right to control, use, lease, 
and dispose of an economic good or service subject to the 
limitations established by laws and regulations. Property, 
by class of owners, may be classified as : 1) private-where 
a private person, either natural or artificial, is vested 
with the right to an economic good; 2) public-when formally 
organized government units like cities, districts, munici­
palities, or other governmental institutions are vested with 
the right to control the economic good; and 3) group-where 
an association of individuals or a community or other group 
of individuals bound together with a common loyalty or 
interest are vested with the right to control the economic 
good. 
Owned and non-owned resources may be classified as land 
resources, capital resources, labor resources and entrepre-
neuship. Each of these categories may be classified according 
to kind of resources and availability level. 
The kind of land resources are classified according to 
soil and other ratings. Soil can be classified by its 
productivity capacity. The basic principles of this classi­
fication are summarized following some of the norms used by 
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Serviclo Cooperative Interamerlcano de Fomento (36). Soil 
is classified in two main groups; Land for cultivation and 
other uses, and land with limitations in use, generally not 
suited for cultivation but good for permanent crops. Within 
these two groups there are four classes each or a total of 
eight. These classes are numbered according to their use 
limitations. Class I embodies lands with virtually no 
limitations in potential use, while Class VIII lands have 
many limitations in potential use. 
This classification is coupled to another rating 
according to the following characteristics: Factor A rating, 
according to the physical characteristics of the surface; 
factor B rating, according to the surface texture; factor C 
rating, based on slope; factor X rating, based on other 
conditions such as drainage, alkali, fertility, erosion, 
microrelief; and factor Z rating, based on climate. These 
ratings are expressed in percentages. Their combined value 
is obtained by multiplying the factors. 
The grouping of land according to its use capacity is 
presented as follows: 
Land Rating Classes of use Capacity 
90 - 100# 
76 - 89# 
65 - 75# 
56 - 54# 
41 - 52# 
29 - 40# 
9 - 28# 
0 - 8# 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
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The criticism of this rating schedule from an economic 
point of view is that the interrelationships of the factors 
described might be altered if they are in a given combination. 
The straight multiplication of percentages will not give the 
correct characteristics of the land and land resources. How­
ever, it is the most advanced classification found and will 
be adopted for purposes of land classification by type. 
The kind of capital resources will vary according to 
objectives of resources, mobility, etc. Subclassifications 
can be worked out for each type of agricultural operation 
and for each region. Also, the availability of each kind of 
capital resources is important to determine its importance 
in production. 
The kind of entrepreneurship could be measured by 
level of education, by relationship to the policy-making 
unit, and by relationships to other policy-making levels. 
The kind of labor could be classified into operator or 
non-operator. The operator could be a private individual 
or a group of people bound together by blood or by a 
political or institutional arrangement. We would also have 
a subclassification according to the type of labor in 
relation with the demands for various kinds of jobs and the 
training required, 
(2) Products or activities The main distinction 
we will make among activities is to classify them as 
a) direct productive activities and b) social overhead 
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capital. The reason for this distinction is mainly that 
social overhead capital's returns cannot be evaluated 
through the sale of a tangible product. This is because the 
product resulting from social overhead capital would have 
to be evaluated through the returns obtained from directly 
productive activities immediately or over a long period. 
Direct productive activities could be subclassified in 
various forms according to the various goals of the farmer 
or according to the range of activities to be found in the 
region: for example, agricultural activities, livestock 
activities, transformation activities. The social overhead 
capital could be divided according to the purpose and levels 
of aggregation: for example, education, land improvement, 
transportation, health improvement^ housing, etc. Each 
group could be subdivided into farm, community, regionally 
or nationally provided social overhead capital. 
( 3 )  Variables affecting physical productivity Tech­
nology, incentives, motivations and structures may affect 
physical productivity originating a variation of the input-
output coefficients. Technological level may be a function 
of the knowledge of the entrepreneur and it could be con­
sidered under entrepreneurship. However, new technology could 
be foreign to the entrepreneur and it could be brought from 
the outside by introducing changes in resources developed out­
side the farm. Incentives and motivations would mainly 
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affect productivity of labor resources but through these 
changes they may also alter productivity of other resources. 
Structures other than ownership may also have influence on 
marginal physical productivity. 
(4) Variables affecting prices Prices may be al­
tered by physical, economic and institutional variables. 
Under physical variables we may include locational attributes, 
communications and transportation. Economic variables include 
elasticities and quantities of factors supplied and elas­
ticities and quantities of products and services demanded. 
The institutional variables would include mainly such factors 
as price ceilings or price support programs by government 
agencies. 
(5) Variables generated in other policy-making levels 
There are some variables affecting the policy-making unit which 
may be based on the following considerations. The individual 
may use his property as he wants until his private rights are 
in conflict with the interest of this community. If the 
interest of a private individual conflict with the normal 
development of the community affecting the activities of the 
community people, then community interest may prevail and one 
or more of the powers of the state may operate to improve the 
situation. 
The government can exercise formal controls like eminent 
domain, police power and taxation to improve the situation 
when there is conflict between individuals and the public 
interest. Police power is the right of the government to 
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regulate the use of property in the interest of public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare, without pay­
ment compensation. It includes zoning, land regulation 
and agricultural production controls. Power of taxation 
provides the means by which government collects the major 
portion of revenues to finance its operations. Eminent 
domain is the power to take private property for public 
use upon payment of just compensation. Government can 
also exercise some other informal controls like the spending 
power or the expenditure of public funds for the public 
welfare. These may be in the form of grants, loans, 
investments and other kinds of financial aid, but always in 
the interest of public welfare. The proprietary power to 
own property and to produce and market the products in 
competition with private enterprise is also a governmental 
tool. 
b. Endogenous variables Endogenous variables can 
be classified into 1) levels of productivity and income 
attained by various levels of aggregation including farmer, 
his community, his region, his nation or even a group of 
nations, 2) level of employment in relation to labor, land 
resources and capital resources also at the various aggre-
gational levels, and 3) opportunities for farmer, his 
community, his region, his country, or a group of countries. 
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4. Summary of the Classification of Variables 
Exogenous variables may be classified as: 
I. Resources 
A, Ownership 
1. Owned by the 
a. Private 
b. Group 
c. Public 
2. Non-owned by 
a. Private 
b. Group 
c. Public 
B, Glass of resources 
1. Land and land resources 
a. Kind: I, II, III,...,VIII 
b. Availability levels 
2. Capital resources 
a. Kind 
b. Availability levels 
3. Entrepreneurship 
a. Kind 
b. Availability levels 
4. Labor 
a. Kind 
b. Availability levels 
II. Products or Activities 
A. Direct productive activities 
B. Social overhead capital 
III. Variables affecting physical productivity 
or resources 
A. Technology 
B. Incentives and motivations 
C. Structures 
policy maker 
the policy maker 
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IV. variables affecting prices 
A. Physical variables 
1. Location attributes 
2. Communications 
3. Transportation 
B. Economic variables 
1. Supply variables 
a. Elasticities 
b. Quantities 
2. Demand variables 
a. Elasticities 
b. Quantities 
C. Institutional variables 
V. Variables generated in other policy-making 
levels 
A. Taxation 
B. Eminent domain 
C. Police power 
D. Spending power 
E. Proprietary power 
Endogenous variables may be classified as: 
I. Levels of productivity and income 
II. Levels of employment 
III. Opportunities for employment. 
5. Policy-making model at the farm level 
The model consists of the relations among variables in 
order to attain a certain preference function. At the farm 
level the policy maker is the farmer himself and he would 
select his target variable. It is assumed that his target 
33 
variables are levels of productivity and income of his farm 
operation. The other endogenous variables would be con­
sidered side effects by him. 
He would try to bring his target variables closer to 
his preference or welfare function. He will determine a 
given end-in-view or attainable objective to push his target 
variables towards it. The concept of end-in-view is well 
stated on Dewey's work (11) and also in Gittinger (17) as 
an intermediate workable objective in a chain of end-in-view 
directed toward higher objectives. 
a. Theoretical model The relationships of the 
variables will express the main elements conditioning 
productivity and income of the farmer. These elements are 
the data a farmer will be faced with. An economic analysis 
designed to solve the problem of achieving the ends-in-view 
would start by formulating a model and then gathering the 
information required to proceed with th# estimationo Ta» 
model could be a linear programming model and it could be 
stated as follows: 
The farmer would maximize a profit function 
c^x^t CgXgf + CnX^ 
where 
n=number of commodities or activities used in his farm. 
Xj=amount produced of the Jth commodity. This would 
mean that he is producing n different commodities i.e. wheat, 
corn, potatoes, etc. 
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Cj=proflt per unit of commodity j or 
c j = P j - ( p ^ i J + P g j ^ . . )  
pjZprlce of the products 
p^ij=price of the resources 
m=number of resources 
The above functions would be subject to the conditions: 
x^>o, X2>o, 
and 
ail%l+ai2X + -^In^-^i 
&2lXl+&22*2+ •'•^2n^n-^2 
^l^l^^m2^2+ ^&mn*n-bm 
where 
aij=amount of resource i required to produce one 
unit of commodity j. 
b^ zavailabillty of resource i by units 
However, this model presents several weaknesses if we 
analyze farmer's productivity and income from a structural 
as well as a developmental point of view. The origin of 
the weaknesses could be studied at three main levels: the 
profit function, the coefficients a^j and the coefficients 
bi. 
(1) The profit function The profit function as 
stated above only reflects the total profit for the farm 
unit and it does not give any consideration to the ownership 
of resources used for the production of xj. if resources 
were furnished by different persons, the rewards to these have 
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to be allocated to the owners in order to avoid conflicts, 
dissociations^ and inefficiencies. Therefore, the coeffi­
cients Cj=p^- +p^mj) would have to be divided 
among the owners of resources giving origin to various 
profit functions (arranged in various rows). Each row would 
have coefficient Cj's representing profits allocated to a 
given owner. A model like this has been presented by 
Benedictis and Timmons (6) including a similar division of 
the various resource coefficients a^j among the corresponding 
owners or suppliers of resources. 
The farmer (policy maker at the farm level) would be 
only interested in maximizing the profit function of the row 
containing the Cj coefficients belonging to him, since the 
other profit functions would have to be allocated to the 
other owners of resources. 
In addition to the ownership factor discussed above the 
cj coefficients may vary. The origin of the variation may 
be twofold, changes in pj=price of the product and changes 
in (Pij+P^^f.....+Pmj)=prlce of resources. The farmer will 
be interested in maximizing pj and minimizing p^j of the 
resources he owns. Factors influencing price levels are 
supply and demand functions (elasticity and quantities), 
degrees of market imperfections, locational attributes, 
Ipor explanation of the terra and further elaboration 
see Timmons (43) 
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communication, institutional factors like marketing channels, 
systems of marketing operations, classification. 
The above considerations show that prices are a function 
of many variables which affect their level. Some of these 
factors may be changed by the policy maker (farmer) while 
some of them may not be under his control. He will be 
interested in the study of factors under his control with 
the purpose of maximizing Cj's and he will also be interested 
in estimating the level of price fluctuation in order to 
determine the desirability of Introducing a parameter ( 21 ) 
in his profit maximizing model. 
(2) The coefficients a^j The a^j coefficients 
are considered as point estimates of the production functions 
of the various resources included in the model. As stated 
earlier, the linear programming model considers them as 
fixed coefficients not subject to variation. However, this 
should not be the case under the assumptions we are using. 
As developed in the Benedictis and Timmons model (6), 
it becomes important to make a distinction of a^^j 
coefficients according to ownership. The reason for this 
distinction is that the a^j coefficients would show the 
productivity of resources which is used to determine their 
corresponding rewards. The farmer would be interested mainly 
in estimating the productivity levels of the resources he 
owns. 
But, the above adjustment still consider a^j coefficients 
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as fixed. The farmer would be interested in analyzing the 
factors which cause the variation in the a^^j coefficients as 
fixed. The farmer would be interested in analyzing the 
factors which cause the variation in the a^^ coefficients. 
He may start by investigating which is the effect of the 
resources he does not own upon the other resources because 
the above discussion Implies that only owned resources would 
give him some reward. However, this is not true because the 
addition of non-owned resources into his operation could 
have the effect of affecting the a^j coefficients of owned 
resources through complementarity. This implies that 
non-owned resources may have an indirect effect on farmer's 
profit maximization by causing aj_j coefficients to change. 
The a^j coefficients may also be improved by the 
application of better technology, efficiency of use and 
also, especially in the case of labor by such motivational 
factors as enjoyment of work and incentives to increase 
their willingness to work. 
The above discussion shows that the assumption of 
fixed coefficients is a strong weakness of the linear 
programming model since a^j coefficients may be a function 
of the level of application of other resources, technology, 
psycological and institutional factors. 
( 3 )  The b^ coefficients The availability of 
resources is one of the linear programming restrictions 
and it also considers them as fixed. However, parametric 
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linear programming models allow for variations on the levels 
of coefficients, variables b^^ coefficients are also to 
be considered by farmers as important data for income 
maximization. 
The purpose of the above discussion was mainly to 
identify some of the factors farmers ought to consider in 
order to attain their target variables. Linear programming 
must be further developed theoretically to handle some of 
the weaknesses outlined above. However, this is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
In addition to the above factors considered within the 
framework of the model there are other factors outside the 
model which are of importance to farmers and they may 
influence indirectly his income. These factors are cost 
of fixed factors and also influence of other policy-making 
levels through the powers they are given by society, 
b. Structural relationships of policy means From 
the exogenous variables and the theoretical model discussed 
in the preceding section some policy means can be selected 
by the farmer to attain the target variables. But a great 
many of them may be considered as "other data" not subject 
to change by an action farmer. 
Figure 2 illustrates the interrelationships of some 
assumed policy means in order to push the target variables 
towards the ends-in-view. The first policy means we will 
consider here will be productivity of the operator (ill). 
39 
Yr 
L A N D  AND O T H E R  R E S O U R C E S  
I 
j LAND 
1 AND OTHER 
RESOURCES 
MARKET 
/ 
MPP: X 
/ M A R K E T I N G  
I 
13 
D 
' L 
FARMERS POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
\ \ \ 
LABOR 
'MARKET 
\ 
r MP?^ - PY 
01 L 
,\iA: -AGE.ViENT AND OPERATOR STATUS 
MP? OF RESOURCES OWNED BY FARMER 
V  
PRODUCT 
MARKET 
2. PRICE RESOURCES OWNED BY FARMER 
5.MPP OF FARMER'S LABOR TIMES PRICE 
OF PRODUCT IS EQUAL TO WAGES 
Figure 2. Structural relationships of policy means at 
the farm level 
4o 
A hypothetical example will help us identify a strategy. 
Let us assume that the operator is producing a given crop, 
i.e., wheat. The market price of wheat is given and stable. 
Let us also assume that one laborer, the operator, is 
responsible for the production of this crop. The type of 
work he performs is always the same no matter how many 
hours he works in the production of this crop. The number 
of hours of labor is the independent variable; production 
is the dependent variable. Under these circumstances we 
can draw a hypothetical marginal productivity curve (MVP^) 
(Figure 3). 
The marginal value product (MVP^) is the change in 
production times price of the product when the number of 
labor hours is varied. As the labor hours increase, the 
MVP2 curve increases first and then decreases. 
The best levels of production are attained when 
MVP^= MC, and perfect competition is assumed. The straight 
line, AC, represents MC = 3. Under these conditions, the 
number of labor hours which maximizes profits from the pro­
duction of wheat by the use of labor is OB = hours. 
As the number of hours of labor increases, MC according 
to productivity would decrease; at point G, MC is zero. 
This happens at the maximum total production obtainable from 
the increase in labor inputs. 
Let us now assume that by investment in the purchase of 
water, the farmer can achieve higher crop yields through 
Figure 3. Marginal value product of labor Increase 
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Irrigation. The result would be an increase in the marginal 
productivity of labor as a consequence of an increase in 
production. Marginal value product after irrigation (MVP2) 
would become six at OG = 7i hours of labor, where MVP^^ 
was zero before irrigation. Irrigation creates a capability 
to absorb more labor in order to cultivate wheat. Labor 
which used to be redundant with a zero MVP now becomes more 
productive. The total maximum production shits to the 
right and MVP g becomes six ('figure 3). This means that if 
we want to increase the marginal productivity of labor, we 
can do it by capitalization works, maintaining the same 
level of labor input. Laborers work equally hard in both 
cases. However, after the irrigation, laborers receive more 
MVP from their work, because of the application of more 
input units (i.e., water) to the fixed factor (a plot of 
land). 
Instead of cultivating wheat, sugar cane could be 
cultivated. This crop requires a greater amount of labor 
than wheat. Therefore, labor productivity is greater at 
OG = 7i hours of labor. This case might also be represented 
by Figure 3. MVP^^ is the marginal value product when wheat 
is planted, and MVPg is the marginal value product when sugar 
cane is planted. The productivity of labor increases from 
zero at G, to six at IG. Figure 3 also illustrates the 
effects of an improvement in the type of work the laborer 
performs because of better education or technical assistance. 
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Therefore, the policy mean under discussion (ill) 
improves the value productivity of the operator. In a 
systematic way, the factors influencing the increase in 
marginal value productivity may be summarized as follows: 
1) complementary increases in MVP through the use of a 
greater number of units of variable inputs on the fixed 
amount of land. The inputs preferred should be those 
having higher marginal value productivity, i.e., an increase 
in capital to shift from labor intensive to capital inten­
sive methods of production, provided the market for outputs 
and inputs is perfect. 2) Increase in the marginal value 
productivity of labor by the use of more productive crops, 
i.e., crops with higher yields and prices, with higher 
capacity of labor absorption. 3) Increasing knowledge and 
education of the operator, i.e., improvement of the kind 
and/or quality of job the operator is able to perform in 
the same number of hours of work. 4) Willingness of the 
laborers to work harder and better. This is due to many 
factors, such as their reaction to the type of work they 
are performing, likes and dislikes of work, degree of risk 
or insurance of return, and knowledge that they will be 
paid justly for their labor. All of this is classified 
under incentives for work. 
The second policy mean to be studied is the amount of 
resources owned (A. I.). The resources owned, which are 
used in the production process, contribute to the earnings of 
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the owner with the rewards for his participation in the 
production process. If the resources are paid according to 
productivity their reward would be equal to their marginal 
value product. Therefore, the farmer should try to own 
capital resources with the higher marginal value productivity. 
Capital resources are scarce under the present conditions: 
their marginal productivity is likely to be high; therefore, 
the owner is likely to obtain a high reward from these 
resources. The way to increase capital resources from the 
farmer point of view is to invest his earnings on more 
productive resources and not on consumption. He should 
restrict the expenditures in consumption to the minimum. The 
savings made should then be invested in the most productive 
capital resources. If the farmer is interested only in his 
farm, resources ought to be provided unto the point where : 
py. MPPl - py , MPPc - py , MPPo - py . MPPm - l.o 
Pl pc "p5~" pm 
where py = price of the product; MPPl, MPPc, MPPo, and MPPm 
are the marginal physical product of labor, capital, land 
and management, while pi, pc, po and pm are the prices of 
these factors, if the MVP of one resource is higher than 
the MVP of another it should be increased until the MVP's 
become equal. Another alternative of the farmer is to 
study the market of capital resources and invest his money 
in resources with higher MVP, even outside the farm. How­
ever, this is not usually possible under the present 
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conditions; the earnings of laborers are very small because 
of the lack of use of capital resources in the farm pro­
duction; thus the farmers' productivity is below or equal 
to subsistence. They need the help of other policy-making 
units, especially because of the lack in availability of 
credit, liquidity and rigidities in farm size and tenure 
structures. 
Wages (price of labor) are the third policy means to 
be taken into consideration here. Wages of labor are 
determined by the supply and demand of labor. If the supply 
is large, the wages tend to decrease; therefore, the 
marginal value product curve would also be depressed, 
because labor would tend to decrease productivity to adjust 
to wages. The reverse would happen if the supply is low. 
The labor demand is given by the needs of labor in the 
market. If labor intensive methods are adopted in new 
industries, the demand for labor would be great and the 
marginal value product would tend to decrease. If capital 
intensive methods are adopted, wages would go down and the 
marginal value product of labor would also be depressed. 
Variables affecting product markets will also have 
influence on the productivity and earnings of the farmer. 
The optimum use of labor units is determined by the marginal 
value product curve and by the price of the product in the 
market. If the market is small and many farmers increase 
their production, the market will be affected; the increased 
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supply of the product will contribute to decrease the 
price of the product if the demand remains constant. The 
marginal value productivity of labor will decrease, causing 
an increase in the number of units of labor which will be 
needed for optimizing production. In other words, the 
amount of land cultivated by each person will be smaller. 
The control of these marketing forces is not under the 
control of the farmer unless he could sell in different 
markets and store his products. He would need the help 
of other policy-making units in these endeavors, especially 
in providing the roads to accessibility of and Information 
about other markets. 
6. Policy-making Model at the Community Level 
The policy means at the community level will cover 
some of the elements which were considered non-controllable 
variables by the Individual farmers. The ability of the 
individual farmers to combine their policy means for the 
attainment of their target variables will have an influence 
on the strategy used by the community council in combining 
policy means at the community unit level. If the farmers 
are not able to meet the target variables of the community 
council, then the council should act, supplementing the 
policy means of the farmers. 
It is assumed that the council of the community has 
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the following target variables: I, levels of income and 
productivity of the community; II., levels of employment 
at the community; and III., opportunity of all members of 
the community. The exogenous variables faced by the 
community council are different from the farmer's because 
of the effects of aggregation, however, they may be classi­
fied in the same way as in the case of the farm. The 
theoretical model for analysis would change however. This 
change is mainly due to considerations about the policy 
maker, and considerations about the target variables. 
The policy maker's range of choice is important at 
this level because at the farmer's level the assumption 
was made that he would work toward improvement of his 
conditions through increase in productivity and income. 
However, at the community level the policy maker could 
design policies which would be in opposition to the desires 
of the majority. Therefore, consideration needs to be 
given to the conflicts which may arise between farmers and 
community policy maker. 
The fact that at the community level the farmer is not 
working exclusively toward his interests may necessitate a 
change from the assumed target variable of profit maximiza­
tion to a composite one which may include the same element 
of profit maximization but coupled with a distributive 
element of provision of employment opportunities to all the 
members of the community. Under these circumstances the 
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theoretical model presented at the farm level might not 
serve the purpose. As will be shown later the community 
level serves a definite purpose for the group# pro­
ductivity that, if not existent, would cause maladjustments 
and dissociations within the group lessening the possi­
bilities of improvement of individual farmers. 
Proceeding with the model at the community level, 
we will first appraise the influence the community council 
on individual productivity. Then, after estimating this 
Influence, we will estimate the needs of the people belonging 
to community in order to design the strategy for the use 
of policy means, 
a. Influence on individual farm productivity 
Following Georgescu-Roegen's (15) paper on lexicographic 
ordering, we intend to show that laborers producing at 
subsistence may prefer to have certain freedom of economic 
decision curtailed as long as they receive commcnourate 
Increases in income to feed their families. Under this con­
cept individual wants are varied and different in kind, so 
we cannot mix them together in a single utility concept. 
As an example of this, we quote Georgescu-Roegen (15): 
In any American household water is consumed to 
the satiety of thirst - therefore, should have 
a zero intensity of utility at that point -
while, since water is not used to satiety in 
sprinkling the lawn, it must have a positive 
final degree of utility. Yet, no household 
would go thirsty - no matter how little - in 
order to water a flower pot. 
In this quotation Georgescu-Roegen is explaining that 
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if several wants are satisfied by a commodity, the marginal 
utility with respect to some wants could be zero, because 
these wants are completely satisfied; but the utility of the 
last unit could be more than zero, because it is related 
to other wants. 
On the basis of this reasoning, we cannot use the 
marginal utility theory in the analysis unless it satisfies 
only wants of equal importance and no others. The principle 
discussed here becomes more complicated because there is 
no one-to-one correspondence between wants and goods. 
Usually, not a single good but a quantity of goods stands 
opposite not a single complete need but a complex of such 
needs. There is a pattern of wants as follows: 
1) The hierarchy of wants seems to be for all men 
identical up to a certain rank, i.e., thirst, hunger, shel­
ter, leisure; 2) individuals belonging to the same culture 
are likely to have in common a still greater number of 
wants at the top of the hierarchy than those common to all 
men. As a result of these, utility of purchasing power is 
greater for the poor than for the rich. The discussion of 
wants up to now helps us to understand their nature. 
We now have a more definite idea of what we are dealing 
with when we mention "the satisfaction of wants". We will 
next turn to the theory of how people make their choices in 
order to get the maximum satisfaction of their wants. By 
maximum satisfaction of wants, we mean the satisfaction of 
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the greatest number and extent of wants, starting with the 
most important. Between two combinations of goods, the 
choice is made according to the lowest relevant want that 
can be reflected in any of the two combinations. 
We will use an example to bring our analysis into this 
frame of reference. The following assumptions will be 
necessary: 
Assumption 1. A given production could be obtained 
from two different types of institutions on which the farm 
could be arranged. We will call the production obtained 
from each arrangement, 1) product obtained from private 
ownership of resources control and, 2) product obtained 
from public ownership of resources, for example. 
Assumption 2. We have three wants: a) The first one 
termed _s is a basic want and consists of the desire for a 
good or the production of enough product to obtain income 
for a good need for subsistence, b) The second want is 
called f (lower than and consists of individual freedom. 
The products of institutional arrangements 1 and 2 can both 
satisfy the basic want _s and compete with each other in the 
satisfaction of £. So, we can say s = xl f x2. c) The 
third want is a lower want consists of desire to satisfy 
others outside the farm and it will depend on the number of 
people who prefer x2 and the number who prefer xl, so 
e « axl + bx2. 
Assumption 3. Want s can only be satisfied by the 
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product of institutional arrangement 2. So, s = x2. 
Assumption 4, There is a level _s in which the want s 
is completely satisfied. 
Assumption 5. We are to decide and make a choice among 
two alternative institutional arrangements. 
Alternative one will be represented by C (xl' + x2). 
Public and private ownership of resources are combined in such 
a way that we are able to combine xl' of XI (private owner­
ship) and x2' of X2 (public ownership). In the same way 
alternative two will be represented by C''(xl'' + x2''). 
Assumption 6. The time period of producing Xl and X2 
is the same. Some convex curves — pseudo-indifference 
curves, which Georgescu-Roegen calls, as Little (26) does, 
behavior curves — will be used to illustrate the example. 
(Figure 4). These are not indifference curves. Any point 
above these curves is preferred to any point on the curves 
and a point on the curve is in turn preferred to any point 
below it. This property of the present behavior curves 
is also shared by the indifference curves. The difference 
between both is that any point on the behavior line could 
be preferred to another point in the same curve. 
The want _s originates a family of behavior curves: 
SS, s's', s'', ps'', etc. The SS curve represents the level 
at which _s is completely satisfied. 
We introduce another family of behavior curves: 
ff, f'f, f'f', etc. This family is originated by the 
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Figure 4. Behavior curves 
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wants f, We will also have the family e'e', e''e'', etc., 
originated by the want e. 
Point A represents a point on the behavior line s's' 
but lying on f'f. As explained before, f'f' is preferred 
to f'f'. Therefore, the point B will also be preferred to 
A. Following the same argument, point D is preferred to 
point B and point E will be preferred to D, while F is 
preferred to E, Note that at this latter level want _3 does 
not have any influence on our choice. 
This indicates that we can order the alternatives we 
have between the two axis exactly as a chain. 
Now we are ready to consider our example and study how 
to choose between our alternatives C and C'. 
If we assume that the levels of governmental and non­
governmental control are of such a nature that with the 
combination C we attain the level s''s'' or c' (xl' f x2')= 
s's', then our choice will be to choose the alternative two 
represented by C', because C' will produce at a higher 
behavior curve of the family _s, which is our basic want. 
The different degree of control used under alternatives C 
and C ' will determine their difference in level of attainment 
of the s want, i.e., desire for a subsistence production. 
2) If we assume that levels of governmental and 
non-governmental control are of such a nature that we can 
attain s's' and C (xl' +• x2') = C ' (xl'' f x2'' ) = s's 
but the combination of xl and x2 produced is such that C' 
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is on point A and C on point B, then we will choose C 
because even though it is on the same behavior line s's' as 
C'', it attains a greater curve f'f". This means that under 
these conditions we will make our choice, taking only the 
second order want as a basis for decision. 
3) If we assume that C' (xl' fx2') = s's' and C'' 
(xl' f x2'') = SS or higher than SS, then we will also choose 
C ' because it attains a higher _s want. 
4) Let us now assume that C (xl' ? 2'') is higher 
than SS, Then ^he want _s will not be used as a criterion of 
choice any more, and we will choose according to the level 
of the behavior curve f attained by C and C'. 
The understanding of these simple concepts seems to be 
important for choice. Hereafter, if this theory can be 
proved to be right, when we talk about the maximum satisfaction 
of the human wants in accordance with our norm, we will have 
to make the qualification of what wants we are talking about; 
so we will first have to order them according to priority. 
The problem becomes much more involved when we study the risk 
and uncertainty considerations more research should be done 
to improve this theory. 
Let us consider the application of these principles to 
appraising alternative institutional arrangements for im­
proving the conditions of community units. 
First we must identify the basic want s. This is the 
responsibility of the elected representatives of the people 
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who will decide what is best for their representees. Thus, 
members of the community would be expected to express their 
wants through him. We will here assume that the repre­
sentatives have studied the problems and desires of their 
representees and that they have decided that their wants are 
the following: 
The basic want is assumed to be the attainment of 
enough income for subsistence (consumption equal to pro­
duction). Of course, consumption will increase when the 
people increases but the habits to which they are accustomed 
may not change rapidly. The threshold in the determination 
of this level would be the maximum level at which the 
second want will start acting as a determinant of choice 
without the influence of basic want s. The second want (f) 
is assumed to be the degree of freedom the individuals pre­
fer acting by themselves without outside influence of any 
kind. Freedom is assumed in the degree of private ownership 
of resources. People may not care too much about freedom 
of action if their standards of living are below the thres­
hold of subsistence (s). Freedom will become an important 
factor for choice after the farmer has passed the threshold 
of subsistence farming. 
In conclusion the hypothesis is advanced here that most 
farmers included within the community unit are below the 
threshold of the maximum level of want _3 (attainment of 
enough income for subsistence) and therefore, these farmers 
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would be willing to accept any degree of Influence from the 
community unit council if they are certain these policies 
will let them increase their Incomes and attain their target 
variables. With this assumption in mind and assuming the 
structures of the Peruvian agriculture permit a reorganiza­
tion similar to the community unit in the near future, we 
will start a theoretical study of the labor supply and 
demand of community people. 
b. Labor supply and demand relationships A community 
under the present conditions of the Peruvian organization 
could be assumed to be a hacienda with many laborers. Some 
of the laborers live in the hacienda and are given a piece 
of land to use with part of their labor; some others are not 
given a piece of land and come to the hacienda from other 
nearby places. 
At this point the community unit is not studied as a 
closed economy rather it is an open economy because the 
influence of nearby places is strong and there is mobility 
of resources and products to the outside. Under these 
assumptions we will start the study of labor supply and 
demand relationships. 
Present day farming structures are related intimately 
to the labor supply and demand. Figure 5 depicts the labor 
market. Two quadrants are included in this figure. 
In the right quadrant, the horizontal coordinate repre­
sents the number of laborers and the vertical coordinate the 
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Figure 5. Labor market at the community level 
wages In cash of laborers. Cash wages are used because 
it is difficult to measure other kinds of wage payments and 
also because laborers usually regard cash wages as a measure 
of exploitation. 
The curve is divided into three main sectors. The first 
one is infinitely elastic (SS') and represents the lowest 
cash wages the villein laborers (laborers living in the 
farm) are willing to receive in addition to wages paid by 
the farm with a piece of land. The number of villein 
laborers is OA. The second section of the supply is com­
pletely inelastic (S'S'). This indicates that laborers 
living outside the hacienda and paid only cash wages are not 
willing to work for wages less than S''. Indian laborers 
are a given number; this number does not usually change. 
However, there are more people within or around the hacienda 
who are not granted a plot of land. These laborers originate 
the third part of the supply (S''S'''). This labor force 
is used by some haciendas in need of extra labor during 
given periods of the year. In addition to the three seg­
ments of the supply curve there are three inelastic demand 
curves on Figure 5. Curve DD represents present conditions 
of the absentee owner's farm and shows that he does not 
demand more laborers than the available ones in the farm. 
However, during special years or on special occasions there 
are some special jobs outside farming to be carried out on 
the hacienda, such as road improvement and canal repairing. 
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which would cause a shift of the demand curve to the right 
(D'D'). The extra amount of work is paid at higher cash wages, 
as indicated by the crossing point of the supply and demand (P). 
The demand curve D"D" Is the typical demand curve of the 
non-absentee owners' haciendas hiring outside laborers in ii' 
order to perform extra jobs required to improve production 
in certain periods of the year. Point T is the institutional 
wage of the region, which is hypothesized to be no higher than 
the subsistence level and it is defined as the minimum wage 
capable to provide people living in the region with sufficient 
income for subsistence at the consumption. It is defined in 
other words as total consumption divided by the number of 
people. 
The left quadrant of Figure 5 refers to the same pro­
blem outlined on the right quadrant. However, the horizontal 
coordinate measures the number of hours of work per laborer 
instead of the number of laborers. Point Q indicates the 
minimum amount of work the villein laborers are required to 
do at the owner's land, measured in hours of work, in order 
to stay in the hacienda. Point R represents the cash wage 
paid laborers to perform temporary extra jobs in addition 
to the institutionalized minimum number of hours they are 
expected to work. Curve QRP indicates that in order to per­
form extra jobs on the owner's land the laborer wants to be 
paid higher wages in cash than usual. The wage would increase 
according to the amount of work to be performed but it does 
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not go to higher levels than the institutional wage rate. 
This is because it would be more convenient for the owner to 
hire laborers from nearby places. 
Let us now make a further analysis of the conditions 
of laborers on an absentee owner's hacienda (Figure 6) in 
order to understand their productivity and employment levels. 
The cultivation within this hacienda follows the double 
system: Land for the owner and land for the laborers; 
however, laborers are the only workers in both lands. Low 
productive lands are given to laborers. In return for this 
land they have to work on the land for the owner. The labor 
productivity will be analyzed separately for the rented 
lands and owner's land using partially the scheme developed 
by Ranis and Pel (37). 
Laborers are in surplus on the rented lands. They 
cultivate their poor lands as much as possible in order to 
attain the highest total physical product. Let us assume 
that one hundred laborers live on the farm under this tenure 
system. It is assumed that thirty of them are redundant 
laborers and another thirty are in disguised unemployment. 
This is shown in Figure 6sections A and B where OH is the 
total number of laborers; FH is the number of redundant 
laborers and GF are the disguisedly unemployed laborers. This 
indicates that the Indians are not fully utilized. They work 
less hours than the normal member they could work. The total 
physical product is assumed to be the same as the 
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Figure 6. Labor productivity and employment in an absentee owner hacienda 
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institutional wage rate measured in agricultural products 
(hi). This is also assumed to be all the income they 
obtain from farming. However, in addition to their work 
on the rented lands they also work on the owner's lands 
where the situation changes in that the laborers work with 
a total productivity equal to SK (Figure 6, sections C and 
D). We assume that there are forty disguised unemployed 
laborers (MK) on the owner's land. The total output JK is 
absorbed by the absentee owner who spends this income in 
activities other than this farm. The marginal physical pro­
duct of laborers at point K is greater than zero but smaller 
than the institutional wage rate. 
This double system is full of inefficiencies and it is 
the origin of conflict between the owner and the Indians. 
Indians are not willing to work efficiently at the owner's 
land because they think they are paid small wages. (The 
cash wages paid to the Indians is paid back to the owner as 
cash rent for the rented lands. This is the reason why it 
is not included in the present analysis.) The owner in turn 
insists that laborers should work harder and efficiently 
because they are paid for their work on the owner's land with 
the rented land. 
In order to improve this tenure system we will assume 
land is expropriated from the owner and transferred to the 
laborers. The assumption is to keep the total physical pro­
duct of labor on the owner's land as a reward for their labor. 
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The assumption is made that the redistribution has already 
taken place and some laborers have been transferred from 
the rented lands to the owner's land. The sixty disguisedly 
unemployed laborers on the rented lands are transferred to 
the owner's land. With this transference the total physical 
product would be UG - NM which according to Figure 6 
sections A and C is greater than double the output HI which 
was previously obtained by the Indians. This also Indicates 
that all of the laborers obtain a marginal physical product 
equal to the institutional wage which also indicates that 
redundant laborers and disguisedly unemployed laborers 
disappeared. Furthermore, since there is a transference of 
sixty laborers from rented lands to owner's lands a total 
surplus UV develops (UV = GL.60) since sixty laborers were 
transferred to the owner's land and hence are not consuming 
from the production of the rented lands. 
If consumption is held at the same subsistence level, 
the total surplus in both rented and owner's land after 
redistribution would be UV f NW (Figure 6, sections A and 
C). Assuming laborers are organized in a community unit, 
they will have the problem of the investment of the total 
surplus. If the marginal productivities are the samie after 
redistribution (although productivity is likely to Increase 
because of the incentives of working on their own lands), 
the marginal physical product for the one hundred laborers 
would be FG (Figure 7, section A). At this point the 
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community council decides to act in order to attain an 
increase of income over subsistence, let us say, JI. This 
implies an absorption of thirty-five laborers out of agri­
culture. This could be attained by using the total surplus 
for paying these laborers to work on community projects 
with SOC purposes including the construction of roads, 
canals and schools and training people in schools. This 
activity could be initiated with few tools which the council 
would provide from savings obtained from the community 
members. If the council thinks it is necessary to start 
DPA (direct productive activities) such as building a 
factory for industrializing the community's product it 
could take steps to encourage these activities. 
Theoretically, the council would promote SOC and DPA 
activities outside agriculture in order to employ disguised 
unemployed laborers. They would attain the income IJ 
(Figure 7, section B). Assuming their labor productivity 
is QJP (reading from right to left) the results of this 
type of activity would be as follows: The absolute increase 
in total value productivity would be GQJ. This would also 
contribute to make the MVP of both types of laborers to be 
equal to the target income IJ. 
The above analysis is theoretical in nature, but the 
hypothesis is made that SOC and DPA may have greater pro­
ductivity than farming with the present methods. The 
community council will need the help of a higher policy-
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making level to obtain part of the necessary capital for the 
new activities. 
The other policy means the council should consider are 
1) availability of capital resources owned by the community 
(A.B.2. b.), 2) taxation to farmers by community unit for 
better uses of capital (V.A.), 3) entrepreneurship (B.3.) and 
4) institutional variables affecting prices (IV.C) with the 
adoption of the suggested redistributed system of community 
unit, two target variables would be attained (reduction of 
the redundant laborers and provision of equal opportunities 
to all members of the community). However, the increase 
in income of the community is still subject to improvement 
and the council has some policy means for generating it. 
The redistribution of land would generate the community 
unit as a defined policy-making unit with a given number of 
members. The council of the community unit would look out 
for the welfare of these people only without the worries of 
improving members of other communities. Through policy 
means 1 and 2 the council would absorb some of the earnings 
of the community members in an effort to keep consumption 
at low levels and to create capital for investment in the 
community. Net returns of the agricultural laborers could 
be absorbed partly for investment in the non-agricultural 
activities. In addition to the above mentioned DPA and SOC 
activities the community could become a unit for a coopera­
tive movement for production, marketing, savings, etc. The 
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effect of the cooperative production, especially through 
pools of tools and machinery, would be to decrease costs of 
production, while the effects of the marketing cooperative 
would be an increase in prices of products especially if the 
markets are small and imperfect as is the case to be the 
analysis of the Ayacucho farm. This would increase marginal 
value productivity of labor. If activities other than 
farming have the greatest productivity, the council would 
allocate the money to activities with the highest marginal 
value productivity. This would generate a further reallo­
cation of labor with more labor being used in activities 
other than farming. 
The productivity of the community unit would be further 
improved if better management practices were used in agri­
culture and non-agriculture. The council would have an 
important impact if it performs managerial activities, 
especially in supervision and supervised credit. The council 
could arrange to obtain more capital (it could be cash or 
in kind) from other policy-making units and provide it to 
the community unit laborers after a production plan had been 
made up. Later on they would supervise this credit. One 
of the difficulties would be to find good managers and 
technicians to supervise the community unit members, but this 
might be the responsibility of higher policy-making units. 
c. Variables generated in other policy-making levels 
Other levels of policy-making supplement the efforts of the 
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farm and community levels to attain their target variables 
and also intervene when the target variables of these lower 
policy-making units are against the targets of the regional 
level. The target variables at the regional level are 
influences by the aggregated community units within their 
borders and by the side effects resulting from their 
policies. 
Most of the exogenous variables listed at the farm 
level could be used as policy instruments at other levels 
of policy-making. 
However, it is important that the policy makers design 
a strategy for the best use of these policy instruments. 
We have seen that the important policy means at the 
farm level were related to the productivity of labor. The 
problem of disguised unemployment cannot be solved in its 
totality by the community unit level. Problems of special 
significance at higher levels become the absorption of 
redundant laborers and also the decrease in disguised unem­
ployment, especially by the creation of more activities 
other than agriculture (SOC and DPA) and the improvement 
of markets. Following is a model from which to study labor 
from this point of view. 
Labor could be planned to be absorbed by the productive 
processes. The decrease in unemployment is a key factor in 
the model. Labor is not homogenous. There are many levels 
of labor productivity which can change from year to year. 
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Demands for the various types of labor are usually not ful­
filled by availability especially of highly prepared labor. 
There could be unemployment in each category which is 
important in Peru because we observe that even highly educated 
people are unemployed. An input-output model could be used 
to explain the demands for various types of labor. The model 
could be (using matrix notation as is presented by Dorfman 
et al (12): 
X = aX + C 
(l-a). X = C 
X = AC where A = (l-a)~^ 
Xo = a'oX = a'oAC = a'o(l-a)-lc = A'°C 
where A'o is the row matrix or row vestor (Ao^ Ao^). 
But it includes only the labor A, unskilled illiterate 
labor, while within the X industries the labor B is in­
cluded. Therefore, the C sector is reduced by the amount 
of increases of the row and column labor B. 
Me are thus considering labor B as a productible 
activity included in the process of economy production 
which requires the participation of all sectors. This will 
also indicate the percentage of interdependence of the labor 
B (more skillful labor) with the rest of the economy. 
We could construct an input-output model for the economy, 
assuming labor B is not a limitant factor, and this would give 
us the levels of attainment of gross national product of the 
economy. 
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This model could be extended to include various levels 
of what has been called unto now labor B. We could call them 
labor Bg B^^, maybe n = 4 or 5. This model would 
also indicate the levels of expenditure needed to attain 
higher education for the increase in labor productivity and 
it would also indicate which industries require more skillful 
labor and which require less productive labor. At the 
beginning of an industrialization process we would have to 
encourage the industries requiring labor B^^ and B2, or 
people with second grade primary education (B^), and with 
five years of primary education (Bg). This model could also 
be treated not from the physical point of view as presented 
up to now, but by using the quantitative model of Leontief 
( 2 3 ) .  
Schultz (39) explains in a recent article: 
The failure to treat human resources explicitly as a 
form of capital, as a produced means of production, 
as the product of investment, has fostered the 
retention of the classldal notion of labor as a 
capacity to do manual work requiring little knowledge 
and skill, a capacity with which, according to this 
notion, laborers are endowed about equally 
How to distinguish between expenditures for consumption 
and for investment. This distinction bristles with 
both conceptual and practical difficulties. We can 
think of three classes of expenditures: expenditures 
that satisfy consumer preferences and no way enhance 
the capabilities under discussion - these represent 
pure expenditures that enhance capabilities and do 
not satisfy any preferences underlying consumption 
these represent pure investment; and expenditures that 
have both effects. Most relevant activities clearly 
are in the third class, partly consumption and partly 
investment, which is why the task of identifying each 
component is so formidable and why the measurement of 
capital formation by expenditures is less useful for 
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human investment than for investment in physical goods. 
In principle there is an alternative method for estima­
ting human investment, namely by its yield rather than 
by its cost. While any capability produced by humsin 
investment becomes a part of the human agent and hence 
cannot be sold it is nevertheless in touch with the 
market place by affecting the wages and salaries the 
human agent can earn. The resulting increase is the 
yield of the investment. 
This article is consistent with the model presented above, 
however, it does not specify the characteristic to measure 
the results of human investment. This is the reason why we 
have used education as a characteristic, with the following 
considerations : 
(1) To have a concrete basis for estimating human 
capabilities considering we would have good census data. 
(2) Every school in Peru teaches at each grade the same 
material, using the same books most of the time, and 
following the same official directions for teaching which 
provides people with a given level of education know about 
the same as any other with the same educational level. 
(3) It would take more reliable statistics to provide 
exact data of other measurements of productivity. 
(4) It would give a ready indication of the levels of 
productivity the counti^ could attain and the kind of 
industries most likely to have success in a given period of 
the country's economic growth. 
Schools are considered as industries, transforming labor 
A into labor B^, or labor Bg, etc. It is important to know 
where the available capital for education should be directed 
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and what level or what percentage of the country's total 
capital should be directed to education. The important con­
sideration here will be the needs for each kind of labor 
force by the most desirable industries for the economic 
development of the country and the marginal productivity of 
labor at each level. 
The study of Balboa (2) about a. comparison of the inter-
sectoral structure of Peru and Argentina and the matrices 
calculated by the Banco de Reserva (4, 5) suggest that there 
is a large triangularty in the Peruvian input-output matrix. 
This means that there is not much backward and forward linkage 
according to the terminology of Hirshman (19) due to lack of 
industrial development which though linkages could stimulate 
the creation of industries providing raw materials for it or 
using their product as inputs. Therefore, the policy maker 
must act to encourage investment in industries that 1) trans­
form domestic or imported primary products into goods needed 
by final demands, and change demand patterns toward these; 
2) transform important semi-manufactured items into goods 
needed by final demands as suggested by Hirshman (20)j 
3) absorb larger amounts of redundant labor as suggested by 
this model; 4) increase the level of education of labor 
(schools). 
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III. ANALYSIS OP STRUCTURES OP THE FARM AND COMMUNITY: 
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OP TWO SIERRA HACIENDAS 
This section presents the partial application of the 
model to two sierra haciendas with their constituent farms. 
One hacienda Is In Cuzco Departamento, hereafter called the 
Cuzco hacienda ajid one Is In Ayacucho Departamento, hereafter 
called the Ayacucho hacienda. The Cuzco hacienda is an 
example of highly productive mechanized agriculture. On the 
other hand, the Ayacucho hacienda is exemplefied by a primitive 
agricultural system and low levels of productivity. The two 
haciendas were selected arbitrarily from the continuum of 
high to low productive haciendas existing in the Sierra region. 
Since there exists no available population from which to draw 
a sample, the two haciendas were selected according to 
criteria established at the beginning of the study to provide 
a highly productive and a highly unproductive farm^. The 
owner's land, cultivated by the Indians as laborers, con­
stitutes a counterpart of the community level. The study 
A conceptual analysis was undertaken prior to selection 
of the specified the following criteria for selection: 
1) Underutllization of land in terms of intensity of land 
cultivation and percentage of land to agricultural use. 2) 
Labor in the hacienda is utilized during certain periods of 
the year and low levels of education and efficiency of labor. 
3) Dissatisfactions among the Indians in terras of low income 
levels and low social and economic status, (4) Conditions of 
community stability permitting a study. 5) Combinations of 
Irrigated crops, dry farm land and pasture land. 6) Not more 
than fifty families or less than twenty-five families. 7) A 
community not larger than 5,000 hectares. 
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starts with determination of the productivity of laborers, 
the income distribution and the associated structures. The 
analysis then continues with the formulation of a diagnostic 
hypothesis to identify the failure and success elements for 
the attainment of the target variables suggested in the model. 
A, The Cuzco Hacienda 
1. Existential situation 
The Cuzco hacienda was selected within a district con­
taining sixteen haciendas. Their characteristics are 
summarized in Table 5, most of them having a similar 
structural organization. The Cuzco hacienda was reported 
to use the improved techniques of production in the "distrito" 
according to discussions with representatives of the Exten­
sion Service in the district. 
Total area in the Cuzco hacienda is 1,213 hectares at 
the core hacienda with an additional 2,000 hectares in the 
annex area. There are 259 hectares on which the owner culti­
vates commercial crops. The rest of the land is steep and 
not suitable for cultivation with machinery. The laborers 
plant their crops on these steep areas, using the 
"chaquitacclla", or foot-operated plow, which was first used 
by the Incas and in less steep places oxen pulled plows. 
An annex to the Cuzco hacienda is located two kilometers 
from the core hacienda. Starting at an altitude of 
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2,730 meters above sea level and reaching 4,000 meters. The 
main reason for its existence as an annex is its ability to 
provide a labor force for the main farm. There are forty-
five families living on this annex. 
The Cuzco hacienda is managed by its owner. He lives 
most of the year at the farm, with semi-monthly trips to 
Cuzco city to transact business. Currently, 57 hectares are 
planted in sugar cane, 110 hectares in corn, 54 in wheat, 
4 in alfalfa, and an additional 34 hectares are in the process 
of preparation for sugar cane. 
a. Farm level: rented lands The model suggests that 
the end-in-view for the farm level is to increase productivity 
and income of the policy maker -- the farmer. However, 
according to the conditions of the Cuzco hacienda, when we 
talk about the farm level we will be referring to the land 
rented by the Indians and being worked by them are rented 
land. Therefore, the farmer in the above sense is not the 
operator of the hacienda, but the Indian who rents a plot of 
land in the core hacienda or the annex. Each one of them 
receives a plot of land from the owner. They are required to 
work for six months of the year on the owner's land as a pay­
ment or rent for the use of their rented lands. The core 
hacienda and annex laborers are studied here. 
The average income obtained by the core hacienda laborers 
is S/. 4,947.04 per year. The annex laborers receive an 
average of S/. 10,483.26 per year. This indicates that inoome 
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of the annex laborers is more than double the income of 
Cuzco farm laborers (Table 4). Structures or exogenous 
variables determining these differences in income are analyzed 
in the model as follows: 
l) Resources 
A) Ownership An important determinant of income 
•'.s ownership of resources. Annex laborers have more owned 
resources than the core hacienda laborers sind this was partly 
due to savings and investments as a resultant of a greater 
time to work in their own farming instead of the owner's. 
The ownership of resources is implicit in the study of the 
class of resources, 
B) Class of Resources 
1) Land and land resources Core hacienda 
laborers cultivate smaller rented plots than the annex 
laborers. Thus, when rented lands are grouped by size, 50 per­
cent of the core hacienda laborers are farming on lands from 
0,2 to 0,4 hectares (average 0,279 hectares) while 50 percent 
of the annex laborers are farming lands above one hectare 
(average 1,304 hectares) (Table 5). 
2) Capital resources The core hacienda 
laborers have less income coming from the use of capital 
resources (cows, donkeys, horses, tools and huts) than the 
annex laborers. This is due to the higher amount of capital 
resources the annex laborers have (Table 6). The core 
hacienda laborers obtain S/. 1,237.25 income from the use of 
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their capital resources, while the annex laborers obtain 
S/. 7,365.90. This factor is a very important determinant 
of income since annex laborers draw 70 percent of their 
income from the use of these resources in contrast to Cuzco 
farm laborers who only obtain a 25 percent income from this 
source, Indian laborers were ranked according to their Incomes 
and it was observed that 2.82 percent of total income of 
farmers belonging to the group of S/. 1,001.00 to S/. 2,000.00 
income was due to capital resources, while 79.30 percent of 
the income of Indians belonging to the group of over 
S/. 10,001.00 income was due to capital resources, 
3) Entrepreneurship There appears to be little 
difference in management even though yields of the annex are 
lower than yields at the core hacienda because of the quality 
of land and weather associated with altitude. Thus, yields 
of com are 835.79 kilos per hectare for the annex and 
862.83 kilos per hectare for the core hacienda. Wheat yields 
are 1,201.97 kilos per hectare for the annex and 1,215.70 
kilos per hectare for the core hacienda (calculated from 
Table 3). This lower productivity may be due not to manage­
ment but to cold weather, steep lands and climatic environ­
ment of the annex lands, 
4) Labor Both annex and core hacienda laborers 
are given a plot of land as large as they can cultivate. 
However, core hacienda laborers have cultivated smaller areas 
than annex laborers. Both core hacienda and annex laborers 
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are given a plot of land as large as they can cultivate. 
However, core hacienda laborers have cultivated smaller areas 
than annex laborers. Both core hacienda and annex laborers 
are paid ai'ound S/. 7.00 per day during the six months they 
are required to work at the owner's land. Why do core 
hacienda laborers cultivate smaller plots than the annex 
laborers? The answer may be found in the system of wage pay­
ment. Not all laborers are paid wages in cash. The farm 
has a store where laborers can get clothing, grain, meat, 
alcohol, etc. Prom this store core hacienda and annex 
laborers can obtain goods in advance of their wage payment 
given to them at the end of the month. Annex laborers seldom 
buy from this store. Core hacienda laborers, on the contrary, 
obtain advancements in cash and in goods from this store 
before the end of the month. This seems to be an advantage 
for them; however, the advancements are so high that wages 
(paid at the end of the month) are not enough to cover their 
debts. The debts are about double their wages, which means 
that Indians spend monthly more than they are paid (Table 8). 
This situation enables the owner to force laborers to work 
on the farm beyond the six months as required. 
In order to support the above statement, a regression 
analysis was made between days of work above the required 
182 days and the debt balance at the end of the month. The 
results from this regression as presented in Figure 8. The 
formula for the regression is : 
DAYS OF WORK 
OVER 182 
282 
182 
100 200 300 500 600 700 000 900 
debts 
Figure 8. Influence of debts on days Cuzco farm laborers work at the farm 
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Y = 4.98 - 3.7657337X 
Coefficient of correlation: r = O.8971 
Variance: - 0.8009^638 
The test of the hypothesis Bo = 0 considering error 
of 0,05 percent gives the following result: 
7.1593837 
0.3720837 Bo 
Since annex laborers allocate more time to cultivation 
of their rented lands and to grazing their livestock, they 
obtain higher incomes from these activities which are deter­
minants of their higher incomes. 
Another determinant of income per capita is the number 
of dependents. On the average, unmarried core hacienda 
l a b o r e r s  h a v e  a n  i n c o m e  o f  S / .  2 , 9 7 2 . 4 7  p e r  c a p i t a  ( T a b l e  9 ) ,  
while the income per capita of unmarried annex laborer is 
S/. 4,490.52. A core hacienda laborer with eight dependents 
obtains an income per capita of S/. 1,027.88 while the same 
kind of laborer at the annex obtains S/. 1,974.39 per annum. 
b. Community level: The Cuzco hacienda as a whole 
The model suggests that the target variables at the community 
level are levels of productivity and income of the community, 
levels of employment, and opportunities to all people within 
the community. 
The hacienda as a whole is a community of people living 
within the farm. The main authority is the owner. The 
owner's land and rented lands represent all the land of the 
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community. The Cuzco hacienda as a whole is studied here 
following the classification of resources considered among 
the exogenous variables given in the model. 
l) Land and land resources The Cuzco hacienda 
as a whole the community — is owned by one owner. The Indian 
laborers are, therefore, working on rented lands. Productivity 
and size of land is different for the owner and those who rent 
lands. On the rented lands, average yields per crop for com 
is 862.83 kilos per hectare and for wheat, 1,315.70 kilos 
per hectare. On the owner's land the average yield per crop 
is 3,000 kilos per hectare for corn; 3,840 kilos per hectare 
for wheat. On the owner's lands there are two periods of culti­
vation per year, making a total of 6,000 kilos per hectare of 
com and 7,680 kilos per hectare for wheat per year. These 
figures indicate that the owner's land is around seven times 
as productive as the laborer's land. 
Owner's land can be classified in groups II and III while 
Indians' land can be classified in group V (See the model — 
Farm level). 
The rented lands are below subsistence or at subsistence 
in the Cuzco hacienda in that all products are consumed or 
traded for consumption. The owner's lands are above sub­
sistence. Subsistence was defined earlier as the level of 
production which permits the farmer to have an income equal 
to consumption. Land is distributed unevenly in the Cuzco 
farm. The owner reserves 260 hectares for cultivation for 
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himself, while the average surface the Cuzco farm laborers 
cultivate is 0.530 hectares and the annex laborers, 0.932 
hectares. 
2) Capital resources The owner works with his 
own and borrowed capital. The Indians do not borrow. Figure 
9 shows the credit situation of the Cuzco hacienda owners. 
This indicates that the owner could get borrowed capital 
for an efficient work while Indians have to rely on their 
own resources (Table 10). 
3) Entrepreneurshlp Ability for management 
could be measured by the level of education and by other 
factors. The owner of the hacienda as the manager; he does 
not work as an operator and his education is high. The 
Indians are managers of their rented lands. They are also 
the operators, and they have no formal education. As a 
manager, the owner obtains S/, 15,700.51 per hectare if he 
cultivates first year sugar cane; 18,185.51 with second to 
fourther years of sugar cane; S/. 7,448,51 if he plants one 
hectare of wheat; and S/. 0,609.29 if he plants one hectare 
of com. The Cuzco farm laborers would only obtain 
S/. 2,400.00 if they planted one hectare of corn and S/. 
1,334 if they planted one hectare of wheat. However, their 
total income is just s/. 390.00 because they are unable to 
cultivate a full hectare under the working conditions 
analyzed previously (Table 11). 
4) Labor The operators of the owner's land are 
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groups of people while on the rented land they are individuals. 
The tenancy system is such that payment is made by working 
the owner's farm. 
Labor productivity can be measured by the amount of land 
a laborer is able to cultivate during the year. In order to 
cultivate an hectare of sugar cane on the owner's land 1.11 
men work every day of the year, including Sundays. There­
fore, a laborer cultivates only 0.9 hectares of sugar cane. 
Another statistic, this time calculated for the whole farm, 
indicates that 386 days of labor are needed to cultivate 
a hectare of land (calculated from Table 12). There, a 
laborer working every day of the year is able to cultivate 
only 1.4 hectares if the data of the farm as a whole are 
taken. These statistics provide indices of the labor in­
tensive techniques of cultivation. 
2. Diagnosis of the Cuzco hacienda 
Diagnosis is made on the basis of the existential situa­
tion and the target variables stated in the model. The 
labor supply and demand relationships confirm the hypothe­
sized model at the community level. Annex laborers who do 
not work more than six months obtain an average daily wage 
of S/. 6.09. Laborers coming from other places receive an 
average of S/. 7.51 per day. The core hacienda laborers 
are paid higher wages in cash than the annex laborers because 
they perform extra jobs besides the required ones. 
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The demand for labor on the Cuzco hacienda is higher 
than the number in the resident labor force. Fifty-eight per­
cent of the work is done by the Cuzco farm laborers; sixteen 
percent is done by the annex laborers; and twenty-seven percent 
is done by outside extra laborers (Table 13). 
The analysis of the existential situation shows that 
there is a considerable difference in the Indians' per-capita 
income in relation to the owner's income. This difference 
creates conflict between the laborers and the owner. There 
is discontent among the laborers and most Indians interviewed 
expressed a feeling of being exploited. This discontent 
could lead to open revolt against the owner. 
There was a rebellion on the nearby hacienda. Owner­
ship had been claimed by the municipality; however, titles 
proving ownership did not exist. Laborers paid rents to the 
municipality in an indirect way. The municipality rented 
the hacienda to five owners of nearby farms, one of them the 
Cuzco hacienda owner. These renters did not cultivate this 
land. The purpose of renting the land was to use the Indians 
living thereon as laborers on their respective farms. The 
Indians had an obligation to work on the renters' haciendas 
six months of the year. They had the feeling that they were 
exploited and were paid below normal wages, so they formed 
a labor union. The labor union decided that the Indians 
should not work at the renters' haciendas because they were 
the owners of their plots of land. This conflict went to 
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court. The court decided that the Indians should continue 
paying rents (working six months at the renter's haciendas). 
The Indians did not accept this resolution. 
The labor force may be rewarded at rates below their pro 
ductivity. There is a big difference between the net income 
obtained by the owner and the income obtained by the 
laborers. The owner's net income for a one-year period is 
S/. 1,536,630.3^ (Table l4). The average net income ob­
tained by laborers is S/. 4,947.04 per annum (Table 6). The 
owners' and Indians' net incomes were calculated by sub­
tracting variable and fixed costs, except management, from 
the gross income. 
There is also a difference in the incomes of laborers. 
Around one-third of the Indian laborers working on the Cuzco 
hacienda are in a total gross income bracket ranging from 
S/. 2,000,00 to S/, 3,000,00 With an average of S/, 2,413,44 
per annum. The other two-thirds are distributed from an 
average of S/, 1,413.76 to an average of S/. 12,377.47. 
On the average, 59 percent of the total gross Income per 
worker comes from his wages; 25 percent comes from capital 
resources, and only 8 percent is from crops. 
Indians work on the owner's lands in order to obtain a 
plot of land for cultivation. However, they do not work 
efficiently. The owner has to provide "mandones" (a kind 
of guard) to force them to work. They are forced to work a 
long period every day. The work starts at 6:00 a.m. and 
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continues until 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 to 5:30 p.m. This 
is a 10 l/2-hour schedule of work. This schedule can be 
qualified because they lose some time going to the land for 
work and taking breaks for "chicha" (sugar cane Juice in pro­
cess of fermentation). 
This long schedule does not permit the laborers to work 
on their own plots. Their families have to work the plots 
and this work is both inefficient and inadequate. Thus, the 
core hacienda laborers must rely on wages for their livelihood. 
The annex laborers have different outlooks concerning work 
and sources of income. They are given bigger farms, they 
raise their own livestock and they do not have to work six 
to twelve months of the year on the owner's land. The latter 
is due to the fact that they have enough money during each 
month and do not need to ask for advancements greater than 
their income. They have the incentive to work on their own 
plots most of the time. Thus, they have a higher income than 
the core hacienda laborers. 
Core hacienda laborers usually do not have oxen for 
working their own plots. One day of work by rented oxen 
costs S/. 20.00. Most Cuzco farm laborers cannot afford to 
pay this amount in cash. They have to work mostly with 
"chaquitaclla" (foot operated plow). 
Because of this lack of money, they cannot buy seed, 
fertilizer or insecticides. 
The analysis of this system suggests some important 
88 
actions for improvement. 
The annex laborers accumulate capital in the form of 
livestock; some buy considerable amounts of livestock. They 
also have demonstrated ability for trading. If they were 
provided with technical advice about breeds of livestock, 
management of grasses, etc., they would attain an even higher 
income. 
Annex laborers show ability for working hard and im­
proving their methods of production. The incentive is the 
plot of land they are given, and the six months they are 
left on their own. Their willingness to improve their living 
conditions is high. Some of the interviewed laborers said 
they would expect to send their children to school. Family 
improvement is another high incentive they have lor working 
efficiently. 
Cooperative work is observed among the Indians, 
especially among relatives or friends living in the same area. 
They share their oxen when they need to perform an urgent 
Job. It is also observed that they help each other in various 
farming activities. This indicates they could develop 
cooperatives if they were provided leadership and a system 
of organization. 
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B. The Ayacucho Hacienda 
1. Existential situation 
The Ayacucho hacienda located about 9,000 feet above 
sea level, includes approximately 2,000 tillable acres and 
1,000 acres of non-tillable land used for grazing cattle. 
The latter is very steep land with slopes over twenty per­
cent and the grass is scarce and short. 
Wheat is the main crop, planted on eighty percent of 
the cultivated leind. Some other crops planted on a few 
acres of land are corn, potatoes, beans, peas, "habas" and 
many other secondary crops. Every year twenty-five Indian 
families rent one-fourth of the tillable land. The other 
three-fourths is kept for the owner. These owners' lands 
are divided into three parts so that one is cultivated and 
two remain idle each year. Under this system each part is 
cultivated every three years, remaining idle for two conse­
cutive years in order to "recover its fertility". No 
fertilizer is added to improve the soil because of 1) lack 
of knowledge about the availability of fertilizer, 2) custom 
and especially 3) the owner's reluctance to spend money. He 
does not have much money and is not willing to risk it. 
There are twenty-five families living at the hacienda. 
The land assigned by the owner to each family varies in pro­
ductivity but usually is of low fertility. Indian families 
pay a low rent (s/. 1.00 per year per acre) for the land they 
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cultivate. Farm cash expenditures are near zero, since the 
payment to the laborers (S/. 0.20 per day) is made once a 
year and it is offset by the rental charge to the Indians 
for their plot of land. The landlord is willing to rent the 
poorest land to the Indians, usually the badly eroded steep 
slopes or stony lands. The Indians work very hard on this 
land and try to obtain the msiximum physical production out 
of it. The quality of their work on these lands is high. 
The owners' lands are the best sind most productive lands 
of the farm. They are flat, clean, and free of erosion. The 
owner pays the laborers S/. 0.20 per day of work. The Indian 
works inefficiently for such a low wage. 
2. Diagnosis of the Problem 
The Ayacucho hacienda as a whole is considered as a 
community and it is studied as such. As a first diagnostic 
hypothesis, willingness to work is considered a function of 
wages. The assumption is made that wages of Indians working 
on their lands should be S/. 10,00. This was determined by 
imputation of total value product to labor in terms of 
marginal productivity of comparable labor from other farms 
where all the factors were rewarded according to marginal 
productivity, other things being equal. 
Using Leibenstein's reasoning (22), modified as shown 
in Figure 10, the productivity of labor is substantially 
higher on the "rented land^ than on the owner's land. 
^ wage 
T (SOLES) 
1 2  8 16 20 
MARGINAL VALUE PRODUCTIVITY TOTAL LABOR 
PER CAPITA 
Figure 10. Inelastic supply and productivity of the twenty-five laborers 
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because of the willingness of the Indian to work more effi­
ciently when he is paid more. The Leibenstein reasoning is 
that when wages are low, labor is less productive because of 
a lack of nutrition and sickness, when wages are higher, labor 
becomes more productive due to better food, improved health 
conditions which favors the development of intelligence and 
skills. However, under the Ayacucho hacienda laborers 
conditions variations in productivity of labor may also be 
due to unwillingness to work when wages are extremely low 
and willingness to work more when wages are higher. 
The supply of labor is Inelastic (Figure 10 assumes an 
elasticity of zero). Only twenty-five people are used on 
this hacienda. This does not mean that the twenty-five men 
will always work at the same productivity level. If they 
are paid higher wages, they will be willing and able to work 
more efficiently. 
At present, the productivity obtained from the direct 
work of the laborers can be hypothesised to be S/. 4.00 in 
a scale of productivity arbitrarily designed in relation to 
the marginal contribution to the value of the product. Under 
this framework, when they are paid S/, 0.20, they are being 
paid below their productivity of S/. 4.00. It is hypothesized 
that if they were paid S/. 4.00, their marginal value pro­
ductivity would be S/. 12.00; if they were paid S/. 20.00 
their MVP would be S/. 20.00, 
Thus, the laborers are paid below their productivity if 
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they are paid less than S/, 20.00, The marginal value pro­
ductivity of laborers would decrease as wages decrease, but 
at a lower rate than the proportional decrease of wages. 
The second hypothesis is that Indians on this farm will 
be able to work more productive land if they pay more rent 
to the owner. The owner would be willing to rent them more 
productive land if he receives commensurate rent (Figure 11). 
Productivity of land rented for S/. 1.00 an acre by the 
Indians has a marginal value productivity of S/. 20.00 
ceteris paribus. Indians are, therefore, paying a very small 
sum of money as rent for the land they cultivate. If they 
would pay S/. 20.00, the owner would be willing to let them 
work on more productive land, even to S/. 35.00 of marginal 
value productivity, while if they paid S/. 50.00, the owner 
would be willing to rent them land of S/. 50.00 marginal 
productivity. 
In formulating the above two hypotheses, the assumption 
has been made that there are only two factors contributing 
to production, i.e., labor and land. This assumption is 
fairly realistic because capital is very scarce; no irrigation 
is used and fertilizers are seldom used. 
For an identification of failure elements of the 
Ayacucho hacienda. Figure 12 has been designed. Sections A 
and C of Figure 12 illustrate the situation on the rented 
land while sections B and D illustrate the situation on the 
owner's land. 
RENT 
(SOLES) 
-5.00 
-2 .00  
.00 
50 40 30 20 10 500 
MARGINAL VALUE PRODUCTIVITY ACRES 
PER HECTARE 
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Land is held constant: five hundred acres on the owner's 
land are under cultivation and one thousand acres are lying 
idle; five hundred acres are cultivated by the Indians in the 
rented land. Labor is considered as the variable factor. 
Under these circumstances, the situation could be 
analyzed as follows: 
Laborers work as hard and as perfectly as possible up to 
the point where their labor productivity is zero on the rented 
lands. At this point, they obtain the maximum total product 
from their labor. At the same time, their quality of work 
is high so their marginal productivity curve is as shown in 
section A, Figure 12. Point P represents the level of per­
formance on their rented lands. Point E is the point where 
they will obtain the maximum net income from their work if 
wages are compared with wages in other jobs. However, to 
feed their families, they try to get the maximum total product 
even though their marginal productivity may be very low. It 
is important to mention that under the institutional system 
laborers do not have alternatives for working in other parts 
because they are mostly isolated in their farms. Increased 
mobility of Indians would change the above conditions, and this 
trend is observed in other farms of the region in an attempt 
to improve the marginal productivity of their labor. 
Indians are motivated to work as poorly as possible and 
at as low a productivity as possible on the owner's lands 
because the owner is paying them just S/. 0.20 a day. The 
97-98 
hypothesis has been advanced that laborers are producing 
marginally at S/. 4.00 when they are paid S/. 0.20 (Figure 10) 
assuming they work ninety days a year. This is also 
illustrated in section B of Figure 12. 
The owner is willing to employ as many as eighty-five 
of these inefficient workers at this low wage level to 
maximize his revenue. However, he is limited to twenty-five. 
Laborers are paid in cash at levels lower than their 
marginal productivity. Therefore, they are not willing to 
work as hard on the owner's land as the owner would desire. 
This is one origin of problems and conflicts between the 
owner and the Indisins. Conflicts are increasing as the Indians 
become aware of the conditions of work in other regions of 
the country, especially in the big cities. 
The second analysis holds labor constant and considers 
land as the variable factor. Indians pay S/. 1.00 per acre 
for this eroded, unproductive, steep and stony laind. Because 
of this low rent the owner is not willing to rent them more 
than 500 acres or around twenty acres per person. The Indians 
would be willing to rent from the owner, l600 acres of land 
at the price of S/. 1.00. In the last analysis this means 
that land is not paid for according to productivity in this 
category of rented land, because the laborers should be paying 
S/. 20.00 per acre for the 500 acres rented instead of S/. 1.00. 
The owner should be getting S/. 10,000.00 Instead of the 
S/. 500.00 he now receives (see section C, Figure 12). Under 
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these circumstances there is also pressure and conflict 
between the laborers and the owner, because Indians are asking 
for more while the owner is not willing to give them more at 
the low rental payment. Pressure increases when the Indians 
look at the 1000 acres lying idle each year. They want to 
rent this land in order to increase their incomes. The owner 
does not like to rent this land to the Indians because he is 
sure the Indians would not pay for it according to pro­
ductivity, since the marginal value productivity of the 1,500 
acres of owner's land would be S/. 50.00 per acre. The 
owner would be willing to rent all this area of land if they 
were willing to pay him a rent of S/. 50.00 an acre or a 
total of S/. 75,000.00. Since he does not get this, he 
Just continues with the old system. The owner cultivates 
only 500 acres, following the old methods, and obtains a 
total income of S/. 35,000.00 (see section D, Figure 12). 
This diagnosis of the problem shows a gap between the 
ends-in-view and the existing conditions. Factors are paid 
in cauh below their marginal productivity. Also, they are 
used in such a way that their productivity is low. However, 
the payment below productivity may not be as great as it 
appears; Indians are paid S/. 18.00 cash plus S/. 380.00 
in rented land. (s/. 20.00 is the MVP of one acre of land 
and they are given twenty acres. This makes a total of 
S/. 400.00 less the S/. 20.00 they pay as rent). They pay 
S/. 20.00 in cash for the rent of the land, plus S/. 3^2.00 
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through their labor in the ovmer's land (s/. 36O .OO is the 
productivity of their work at the owner's land. However, 
they are paid S/. 18 .OO cash. The unpaid labor is therefore 
S/, 342.00.) The system has inefficiencies and there are 
bound to be problems between laborers and owner due to the 
belief each has that he is not being paid according to his 
productivity. This system makes everybody less productive. 
C. Remedial Hypothesis for the Two Farms 
Using the principles introduced in the model, we will 
make sin evaluation of the failure and success elements of 
various alternative structures. We begin with the evaluation 
of the Ayacucho hacienda. The Ayacucho hacienda offers more 
failure elements to be corrected than the Cuzco hacienda. 
Hypotheses for changing the Ayacucho hacienda system to a 
single rental system and to a system of owner-operators are 
advanced. Two more remedial hypotheses are introduced under 
the same frame of analysis seeking to correct inefficiencies. 
Before stating the remedial hypotheses, a summary of 
the conditions found in the Ayacucho hacienda will be 
presented in light of the model. 
The conditions of the individual farms show the 
following: 
I) Resources 
(A)Ownership 
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1) Owned by the policy maker, the Indian farmer 
a) few small tools and oxen with low levels of 
productivity privately owned by the Indians 
in addition to their labor, 
2) Non-owned by the policy maker 
a) land and land resources privately owned by 
the owner of the hacienda and given to the 
Indians for their cultivation and grazing. 
B) Class of resources 
1) Land and land resources 
a) VI b) below subsistence units, value pro­
ductivity is about S/. 20,00 per acre 
2) capital resources 
a) wooden plows; 2 oxen and some sheep and goats. 
3 )  Entrepreneurship 
a) bad management due to low levels of education 
b) small part of their time devoted to manage­
ment 
4 )  Labor 
a) very hard willingness to work on the land 
b) less than 50 percent of their time is 
available for work on their farm 
II) Products of activities 
A) Direct productive activities "Wheat, barley, 
potatoes and livestock for consumption purposes. 
B) Social overhead capital Almost zero, 
III) variables affecting physical productivity of resources 
A) Technology Low levels, 
B) Incentives and motivations High incentives. 
C) Structures Defective: Land productivity is 
about S/. 20.00 per acre and laborers pay only 
S/. 1.00 per acre. Labor productivity is assumed 
to be about zero because laborers work as hard as 
possible to feed their family because they do not 
have other alternatives. 
IV) Variables affecting prices 
A) Physical variables 
1) Locational attribute originates a small and 
imperfect market. 
2) Communications with the outside the hacienda 
are almost non-existent. 
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3) Transportation to the closest town and to the 
cities is made by foot donkeys or horses. 
b) Economic variables supply and demand forces do not 
work because of the subsistence level. 
C) Institutional variables affecting prices are related 
to the institutions controlling the small markets 
which are very underdeveloped, 
V) Variables generated in other policy-making levels 
A) There is strong influence from the hacienda owner 
who owns all the land and most of the capital 
resources used by the farmers. 
The conditions found on the hacienda as a whole, which 
represent the community level, show the variables divided 
into a double system of owner's lands and rented lands 
described as follows: 
l) Resources 
A) Ownership 
1) Owned by the policy maker, the owner of the 
Avacucho farm, 
a) Land and land resources of the community 
are privately owned by the owner. Part 
of them are rented to the Indian laborers 
as part payment for their work on the other 
part of land which is reserved for cultiva­
tion and grazing for the owner, 
2) Non-owned by the policy maker 
a) Plows and oxen provided by the Indians 
of the hacienda for the work on their 
rented land and owner's land, 
b) Class of resources 
1) Land resources 
a) Owner's land; IV; rented land VI; 
b) owner's lands worked by the Indians as a 
group above subsistence cultivated for 
commercial sales to bakers: 1,500 acres; 
rented lands less than 20 acres per person 
on steep slopes, 
2) Capital resources 
a) Wooden plows, oxen and some sheep and goats 
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b) on small amounts which could be regarded as 
almost non existent in relation to the extent 
of cultivation. 
3) Entrepreneurship 
a) Owner's land Bad management due to owners 
absenteeism and emphasis of work in other 
enterprises; rented lands entrepreneurship 
left to each Indian renter. 
b) The entrepreneur or owner devotes 5^ of his 
time to management. 
4) Labor 
a) Unwillingness to work on the owner's lands 
and willingness to work hard on the rented 
lands; 
b) 50^ of laborers time devoted to owner's land 
and 50^ to rented lands. 
II) Products or activities 
A) Direct productive activities Owner's land 
mainly wheat; rented lands wheat, barley, potatoes 
and livestock mainly for consumption purposes. 
B) Social overhead capital almost zero. 
III) Variables affecting physical productivity or resources. 
A) Technology Low levels in both lands. 
B) Incentives and motivation Low incentives to work 
on owner's land because they are paid low wages in 
cash for the hours they work and the products are 
sold by the owner: high incentives on the rent lamd 
since products are for the workers. 
C) Structures Defective since neither labor nor land 
are paid according to productivity. Labor producti­
vity is assumed to be S/. 5.00 and paid S/. 0.20 when 
working in owner's land while land productivity is 
assumed to be S/. 50.00 and rented by S/. 1.00. The 
owner of the land receives a reward equal to S/. 
70.00, greater than the productivity of the owner's 
land per acre. 
IV) Variables affecting prices 
A) Physical variables 
1) Locational attributes originate a small and im­
perfect market. 
2) Communications outside the hacienda are almost 
non-existent. 
3) Transportation by foot, donkeys and horses. 
104 
B) Economic variables Labor supply forces are as 
indicated in the model for the absentee haciendas; 
resource market is almost non-existent; product 
market has a supply which fluctuates during the year 
according to the harvest time, demand is inelastic 
on this small wheat market. 
C) Institutional factors are the determinants of low 
prices for the producers especially because of a 
strong monopoly power exerted by wheat buyers who 
buy wheat at harvest time and store it for the year. 
Variables generated in other policy-making levels, 
A) Taxation 
The community would have tsixation power over individual 
farmers in order to collect a fund to start the SOC 
within the farm and to keep consumption down for 
capital creation purposes. Also, some elements of 
taxation would be included on the stock farmers 
would have of the cooperative organization. 
Suggested here is also the improvement of taxation 
levels at higher policy-making levels. 
B) Eminent Domain 
Would be mainly generated a higher policy-making 
levels than community level. However, after some 
years of work the community may exercise a strong 
activity in balancing the efficiency of cultivation 
by buying inefficient land and distributing it through 
the other owners, 
C) Police power 
Would not be exercised by the community level but 
it may be responsibility of higher policy-making 
levels, 
D) Spending Power 
This could very well be exercised by the community 
policy makers, mainly to increase SOC of the 
community, 
E) Proprietary Power 
Most of the land property would be individually 
owned by farmers. However, some Isuid could be 
owned collectively by the community especially for 
grazing purposes. 
Mauiy of the tools and machinery may be owned coopera­
tively by the community and also by other govern­
mental agencies at other levels of aggregation. 
This double system creates inefficiencies in the use of 
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resources and ability of Indians to improve if rented lands 
are considered separately as distinct sections of the farm. 
Variables are not combined structurally on the best possible 
way. The following hypothesis investigate some other 
possible structural arrangements to improve the situation, 
1. First hypothesis; Single System 
The first remedial hypothesis stated is the elimination 
of the double system of rented and owner's lands. The 
first obstacle to attain the goal or norm would be eliminated 
if a system of a single cash rent for the farms within the 
hacienda is adopted in which the factors would be rewarded 
according to their productivity. 
In order to study the results of this hypothesis, a 
reallocation of resources is considered. The 1,500 acres, 
the owner's lands, will be subdivided and rented to the 
twenty-five Indian families in such a way that the rent will 
be equal to the marginal value product of land. It is 
assumed that labor of the rented lands will be transferred 
to the good lemd (owners' land). Quality of labor will be 
as efficient as laborers perform on their own plots. 
The first adjustment to be made for the analysis is to 
convert land and labor to units of same quality. One unit 
of labor on rented lands will be considered as a standard 
unit of labor after adjustment in the system is made, and one 
acre of owner's land will also be considered as a standard 
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unit of land. Labor on the owner's land will be regarded 
as 0.2 standard units of labor (estimated from its pro­
ductivity), so twenty-five men working on the land under the 
old system will become just five standard units. The same 
will be the valuation of one unit of rented land so that 
500 acres will be considered only as 200 standard acres. 
This example is suggested in order to speculate on what 
would happen if the system were varied. 
Figure 13 illustrates how the total value product ob­
tained from the rented land was S/. 11*800 while the total 
value product obtained from owner's land was S/. 35,000.00. 
The first figure was obtained with the use of 200 standard 
units of land and 25 standard units of labor, while the second 
figure was obtained when 500 units of land were used with the 
equivalent of 25 standard units of labor. With the help of 
the adjustment to standard units, it is possible to illustrate 
the marginal rate of substitution of labor for land at each 
level of application of these units and this is illustrated 
as a hypothesis in Figure 13. This also suggests what the 
result would be if 25 standard units of labor were applied to 
the 1,500 acres of owner's land if no other change were to 
occur. 
The marginal value productivity of labor and also the 
marginal value productivity of land would be higher than 
before with the application of the better kind and quantity 
of labor to good land instead of the steep poor areas. (See 
labor 
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Figure 13. Labor-land relationships and total value product 
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sections A and B of Figure 14). Therefore, the marginal 
productivity of labor would be S/, 20,00 a day (S/. 
45*000.00 a year for the twenty-five laborers), while the 
marginal value productivity of the 1,500 acres of land 
would be S/. 70.00 per acre or a total of S/. 105,000.00 
for the total area. This makes a total of S/. 150,000.00 
of total production if this arrangement is established on 
the 1,500 acres of owner's land without even cultivating 
the areas which at present are being rented by the Indians. 
The income of the Indians would go up from the S/. 398.00 
they were paid before to S/. 1,800.00. Since they would be 
renting the land, they would pay the owner according to 
productivity, which means they would be paying S/. 70.00 
per acre for land to the owner. The owner would obtain a 
total of S/. 105,000.00 of cash payment, instead of only 
S/. 34,950.00 as in the old system. 
The same results would be obtained if, instead of 
renting the 1,500 acres of his lands, the owner would like 
to manage it by himself and pay the laborers according to 
their productivity. Under this arrangement, each laborer 
should get S/. 1,800.00 for his work. However, this would 
create disadvantages. The Indians would be restricted in 
their freedom to do the Job as they want and, therefore, they 
would not work as well as they do by themselves. We are 
assuming here that the owner does not give effective leader­
ship and also that his technical level is very low. There 
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would also be some social pressure because the Indians would 
be working under the orders of someone else and they would 
not be able to perform and perfect their managerial abilities, 
This is why we reject this hypothesis as inferior and give 
more credit to the rental hypothesis at present. 
Let us now examine what are the required conditions for 
this cash rent to form a perfect leasing system when all the 
factors are paid according to their productivity. This will 
bring us back to the concept of imputation and the Euler 
theorem. The total physical product (TPP) or the total value 
product (TVP) can be broken up into share such that the 
reward to each factor is equal to its marginal value product. 
The other assumption is that the elasticity of production 
is equal to one, because this is the only point where there 
is exhaustion of the total product. When elasticity of pro­
duction is one, the average physical product (APP) is the 
maximum. The imputational procedure then, using Dr. Heady*s 
formulas (l8) will be; 
RI, = V - C - Pp . M . P ^.S) 
or 
RL = V - (Pq . C T Pjjj M T Pg . S) 
RL = Residual return to labor 
V = TVP 
C = Capital 
M = Management 
S = Land 
L = Labor 
P = Price 
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The main element which makes this single system different 
than the double system studied before is that it can no 
longer be regarded as a community but a conglomerate of 
individual famers renting their lands and working alone not 
in association with the others. Therefore, it can be com­
pared with the individual farms of the Ayacucho Hacienda as 
follows: 
I) Resources 
A) Ownership 
1) Owned by the policy maker, the individual farmer, 
a) Same tools and oxen as in the previous condi­
tions. 
2) Non-owned by the policy maker, 
a) Laind and land resources privately owned by 
the owner of the hacienda and rented to the 
Indians. 
B) Class of Resources 
1) Land emd land resources 
a) IV J 
b) Unit would be above subsistence and operated 
for commercial purposes by each Indian: 
60 acres, 
2) Capital resources 
a) Same resources as in the previous conditions. 
3) Entrepreneurship 
a) and b) Same conditions as in the previous 
case. 
4) Labor 
a) Very hard willingness to work on the land. 
b) About 100^ of their time would be devoted 
to farming. 
II) Products or Activities 
About the ssime conditions as in the previous case. 
III) Variables affecting physical productivity of resources 
A) Technology Low level. 
B) Incentives and motivations High incentives to work 
for their families and increasing profits. 
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C) Structures Non-defective since they pay according 
to productivity of the land. Marginal productivity 
of labor will be S/. 20.00 a day or S/, 1,800 per 
year per 90 days. The owner of the land would get 
S/. 105,000.00. 
IV) Variables affecting prices 
Same conditions as in the previous case 
V) Variables generated in other policy-making levels 
There would not be any influence of the hacienda owner 
upon each farmer and there seems not to be any strong 
influence from the outside upon them. 
2. Second Hypothesis: Shifts in Ownership to Family Farm 
UWnei* Operated 
This section is the study of other means for increasing 
the labor productivity. Rewards may be paid according to 
productivity in the first hypothesis, but laborers would still 
have very low income in relation to the needs for subsistence. 
What would happen if instead of renting the land from 
the owner, laborers bought it and cultivated their own land? 
Laborers would get the marginal value product of land of 
S/. 105,000.00, which is around S/. 4,200.00 per laborers, 
plus their wages for working in the land plus management 
rewards. This amount added to the S/. 1,800.00, or their 
productivity, would add up to S/. 6,000.00. This is a con­
siderable increase. 
How would they have to pay for the farm and how would 
they raise the money to buy it? After redistribution, land 
would cost S/. 1,050,000.00 if we consider the marginal 
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productivity of land as ten percent of its total value. This 
would mean that Indians would have to pay S/. 42,000,00 per 
share and they would be able to pay this in ten years. How­
ever, it seems reasonable for them to pay according to the 
farm's productivity at the time of the purchase, when the 
systems of cultivation were deficient. Productivity was 
S/, 35,000.00 (S/, 70,00 X 500 acres cultivated per year), 
therefore, land would have a value of S/. 350,000.00 at the 
redistribution period, Indians would pay S/, 14,000.00 per 
capita. Assuming this were paid in twenty years, they would 
have to pay only 700,00 per capita per year, plus interest. 
The result would be that the income obtained by the Indians 
would go up to S/, 6,000,00 - S/, 700.00 S/, 5,300.00, a 
substantial increase over their present income. The owner 
would receive a total of S/. 17,500.00 a year for twenty years. 
Under this system the new owners would also be working 
alone individually and we could not think of the existence 
of a community. The main difference with the previous system 
is the ownership of resources. Under this system Indians 
would have a plot of land of their own and they would culti­
vate it by themselves. Would this be the best system or 
better system could be found? In order to have a clearer 
answer to this question, failure and success elements in terms 
of the end-in-view of increase in income and productivity of 
the farmer should be examined. Failure elements found are 
1) lack of technological knowledge, 2) uncertainty of the 
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outcome, 3) lack of substitute patron, 4) lack of entrepre-
neurship and leadership, 5) inflexibility in size of the unit, 
6) indifference of the owner to social ends, 7) isolation 
from civilization, 8) lack of credit facilities, 9) market 
inefficiencies, 10) lack of physical facilities, 11) fixed 
habits. Success elements are 1) provision of incentives to 
work, 2) no basic change in structure, 3) security of 
expectations, 4) less bureaucracy. 
a. Failure elements of the Second Hypothesis 
1) Lack of technological knowledge. In order to increase 
their productivity curve, Indians need to improve their 
technology. They will be faced with the problem of how to 
change methods of production, how to cultivate other more 
productive crops, how to fight the pests and diseases, which 
are the best periods for cultivation of different varieties, 
which are the best varieties for the altitude, the environ­
ment and the precipitation of the zone, which are best levels 
of fertilizer application, how resources can be organized more 
efficiently from the economic and physical point of view. 
2) Uncertainty of the outcome. They would not be willing 
to change methods because of the uncertainty of the outcome. 
There would be a kind of uncertainty aversion. If Indians 
were more educated, the uncertainty could become risk. Uncer­
tainty is responsible for the inefficient use of labor and the 
deficient crop pattern. 
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3) Lack of substitute patron. William W. Stein (4o) des­
cribes as follows the relationships between Indians and patron: 
One very great advantage of the peon-hacendado relation­
ship, which has not yet been mentioned, is the protection 
which the mestizo patron may give to his Indian peons. 
Some of the landholders of Tactabamba are not very 
powerful mestizos: others are close to the top of the 
Carhuaz socio-economic hierarchy. But any mestizo is 
better able to obtain Justice than an Indian, The 
mestizo is able to do business in Spanish and to under­
stand legal processes. The Indian is disparaged because 
he is an Indian, Moreover, there is a certain broad 
solidarity of 'mestizones' as opposed to the Indian 
social category. If a legal problem does not involve 
a more powerful person or a social equal, the mestizo 
is more likely in general to receive a judgment in his 
favor. The peon, therefore, receives a certain amount 
of protection from his patron, if it does not conflict 
with the latter's interests. The patron intercedes 
for his peon before the law. The patron may make 
arrangements with the local equivalent of the draft 
board to keep his peon out of the army. The patron 
may apply pressures on local and town authorities to 
exempt this peon from participating in/ or contributing 
to the local tributary labor organization. 
One significant aspect of the role of the patron, is 
his position as gratifier. A good patron will take 
care of his Indians, will feed them well and give them 
gifts. An Indian will in turn give his patron small 
gifts to win his favor and recognition Many of the 
people of Monus are content with their dependence. This 
is not only a matter of the economic situation but seems 
to involve personality characteristics. 
It is important to keep these concepts in mind when changes 
in ownership are being considered. There may be a decrease 
in productivity and in the development of the Indians if a sub­
stitute patron is not offered to them for some years while 
the transformation is being made and later, until the Indians 
can be self-sufficient. As a result of lack of owner or patrons 
advice, Indians may decrease productivity. They may lack 
seeds for planting, money for acquiring some small tools to 
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to work with or ability for selling their products in the 
market. A substitute patron may be needed for a certain period 
of time to make adjustments. The patron may be replaced by 
a different organization established to insure efficiency of 
operation among the Indians. 
4 )  Lack of entrepreneurship and leadership. Indians are 
not used to performing activities by themselves. At present, 
they do not appear to have the innovator's ability which would 
lead them to the creation of new systems of cultivation and 
a different arrangement of the product mix. Indians are not 
sufficiently educated to perform these activities by them­
selves. Market information cannot be given laborers to be 
used in redirecting their production activities. 
5) Inflexibility in size of the unit. As technical know­
ledge increases, capital grows, education improves and 
uncertainty decreases, the efficient size of holdings changes. 
Family farms would present the problems of Inflexibility in 
size. At the beginning the size could be set up as an 
economic unit, but later on the increase in population, 
inheritance laws, and other factors could turn it into a non-
economic unit. Economic unit is defined here as a holding 
whose size (resource content) makes it capable of producing 
an output comparable to a family income norm derived from the 
policy maker's preference function which reflects the utility 
or wants of the society. 
6) Indifference to social ends. Growing out of the 
117 
Peruvian psychology this arrangement would originate in­
difference of the new-owner to social ends such as resource 
conservation. It would tend to encourage land speculation, 
especially if there are not alternatives of investment other 
than the purchase of land. 
7) Isolation from civilization. There are no highways going 
to the farm except a horse road. This fact makes it impossible 
for the Indians, if there were educated, to read papers or 
hear news about what is happening in the outside world. 
They could listen to the radio but the stations are not 
sufficiently developed in the area. 
8) Lack of credit facilities. Capital would be one of the 
more limiting factors in the process. According to the 
Ayacucho farm and Cuzco studies Indians do not borrow from 
the agricultural bank. During the survey it was found that 
Indians do not have precise knowledge of the existence of the 
bank and its functions. Under these circumstances and 
because of his being unaware of credit possibilities, the 
Indian is not able to expand his production or to buy seeds 
and other supplies for cultivating his plot of land. 
9) Market inefficiencies. Indians sell their products 
mostly in small local markets. In the Ayacucho market, wheat 
is sold to local bakers mostly during the harvest period. 
Wheat supply is very inelastic since the Indians want to ob­
tain their money rapidly at the time of the harvest and the 
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bakers are the ones who buy wheat at that time to use it slowly 
during the rest of the year. Thus, when there are great 
quantities of wheat in the market around June and July, the 
price is very low. The Ayacucho wheat market is an isolated 
closed market because of the lack of transportation and the 
lack of knowledge of prices in other regions of the country. 
10) Lack of physical facilities. The Ayacucho hacienda 
lacks running water, either for cultivation or for drinking. 
Indiatns have to walk down to the river about 1000 feet below 
to get water. There are no telephones or mail service and trans­
portation is very primitive. There is only a horse road to 
the city of Ayacucho, Houses of the laborers are very poor 
since their single room is used for kitchen, living room, 
dining room and bam for an average of six people including 
four children. If the children remain with their parents, 
they would have to cultivate increasingly smaller plots and 
their marginal productivity would decrease. 
11) Fixed habits. Indians chew the leaves of "coca" 
which act as a stimulant but causes a reduction in physical 
and mental responses. This stimulant which is consumed in 
great quantities by the Indians is one factor among many others 
that causes the tardiness, melancholy and passivity that pre­
dominates in almost all the Indian population. Frequent 
festivities give Indians an opportunity to spend savings on 
alcohol and fireworks. On the Cuzco farm we found that 
alcohol consumption increased as income increased (See Table 8). 
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b. Success elements found In the second hypothesis 
1) The redistribution into family farms might induce incen­
tives to work efficiently since the output would be sold and 
utilized by the same operator. The marginal value pro­
ductivity curve would be increased because of willingness 
to work harder. This has been illustrated in Figure 3 as 
the MVP2. 
2 )  If titles to land are transferred with some security to 
the Indians their expectations would increase and their 
planning horizon will be greater. This would decrease 
tenancy uncertainty but it would not necessarily decrease 
other types of uncertainty such as weather. 
3) The government would not have to increase its services 
to control the amount of Isind held by each one of these farm 
families. No inefficient bureaucracy would be created to 
decrease efficiency of operation, 
3. Third hypothesis: Government-owned land given to the 
operator for his production 
Under this hypothesis, it is assumed that the rest of the 
economy is already nationalized. This means that the govern­
ment owns the processes of production: it obtains the 
products and distributed the income among people according 
to their marginal productivity and also takes care of the 
poor and of people unable to work. In other words, we are 
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talking about a completely controlled economy. With regard 
to farming, this institutional arrangement would Involve the 
distribution of land among workers, leaving them alone in the 
management of the holdings but exercising control over the 
output obtained from the producers and distributed by the 
government to transforming industries. The farmer would be 
paid in good and facilities for his daily living. His level 
of living would then be in accordance with the total pro­
ductivity of the farmers. 
Conditions under this system could be analyzed only from 
a community point of view since the land would not be divided 
into individual farms but all the people would work at the 
hacienda as if it were one single unit. 
Conditions of the variables could be outlined as follows: 
I) Resources 
A) Ownership 
1) Owned by policy maker, the government 
a) Land and land resources and capital resources 
publicly owned by government 
2) Non-owned by policy maker Nothing. 
B) Class of resources 
1) Land and land resources 
a) IV and VI 
b) 2,000 acres of land, the whole Ayacucho 
hacienda 
2) Capital resources 
a) and b) kind of capital resources and avail­
ability may improve according to the allocation 
of resources made by the government and the 
increase of capital in the whole nation. 
121 
3 )  Ent repreneurship 
a) Would improve if a manager would be assigned 
who would have more knowledge and some 
incentives for doing a rapid job. 
b) The percentage of his time for this hacienda 
would depend on the decisions of the 
government. 
4) Labor 
a) Labor would work as a group in the whole 
farm in a similar way as it is presently 
done on the owner's lands and their efficien­
cy could be increased according to the 
motivations and incentives given. They 
would not be owners, 
b) The number of laborers could vary according 
to the decisions of the policy maker. 
II) Products or Activities 
A) Direct productive activities 
Could be accommodated to the needs of the people of 
the nation emd to the possibilities of production 
of the area. 
B) Social overhead capital 
Depending on the needs and capacities of the economy 
social overhead capital could be invested on the 
hacienda to improve its productivity. 
III) Variables affecting physical productivity of resources 
A) Technology could be improved depending on the 
improvement of the nation's technology and the plans 
of the government. 
B) Incentives and motivations would depend on the 
ability of the government to provoke motivations. 
C) Structures would not be considered deficient if the 
government makes an allocation in relation to pro­
ductivity of the farm and of the nation. 
IV) Variables affecting prices 
Prices would not be important under a system of controlled 
economy. 
V) variables generated in other policy-making levels 
There would be a strong influence from other policy-making 
levels which would directly affect the conditions of the 
hacienda. 
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The analysis of this system suggested that the main 
failure elements are: 1) increase tenancy uncertainty, 
2) change in the political and social conditions of the 
country, and 3) some other failure elements found on the third 
hypothesis. The success elements are: 1) size flexibility 
of the holding, 2) efficiency through premiums, and 3) 
easy redistribution of profits. 
A. Failure Elements 
1) Tenancy uncertainty would be increased since the govern­
ment could change an individual from one given place to another 
if he was not efficient in his previous work. The farmer 
would not feel secure. This tenure uncertainty would depress 
the MVP of labor to low levels. The losses would be greater 
if there is an unstable political climate. 
2) The Peruvian executive government and congress is elected 
through general elections by all the Peruvians. However, 
more than one-half of the population is illiterate and 
according to the constitution cannot vote (during the 1963 
election only literate citizens voted); therefore, government 
and congress are representatives of only one part of the 
population. As a consequence, assuming congress has a voters 
preference function, congress would work mainly for the 
welfare of people who elected them. However, every six years 
a new government is set up. Peruvians who are discontented 
with a given government are able to express their feeling 
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through elections. Under the institutional arrangement we 
are discussing, there would be no possibility for Peruvians 
outside the government to decide their future through elected 
representatives. Theoretically this implies that the pre­
ference functions of the government elite would be imposed 
on people. In the present system, the utility function is 
expressed by one-half of the people. Under the present 
organization of the western world, an institutional arrange­
ment like the one we are discussing, would mean a change in 
the traditional beliefs of people and the freedom they are 
accustomed to and a change on the monetary, social and 
economic arrangement of the government. The farmer would have 
to change his traditional ways of thinking and behaving. All 
of this could mean a decrease in productivity, 
3) There are also some other failure elements already dis­
cussed under the family farm owner operator, whose effects 
do not seem to be different under the government owned lands 
if supplementary activities similar in both cases are not 
undertaken. They are lack of technological knowledge, uncer­
tainty of the outcome, lack of managerial ability, isolation 
from civilization, lack of credit facilities, lack of 
physical facilities, high population growth, fixed habits, 
lack of popular action. 
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b. Success Elements 
1) Size flexibility of the holding. As capital goods would 
be increased in the nation as a result of economic develop­
ment and the farmer would start receiving more machinery 
for his work, he might change methods of production. The 
optimum size of holding according to proportionality effects, 
would increase. Obviously, the extent of the flexibility of 
size change would not be limited, but the limitations would 
be smaller than in family farming. 
2) Efficiency through premiums. Since there would not be 
incentives for a greater production under this third hypo­
thesis of government operated lands, the productivity of 
labor might become as low as in the case of the owner's land. 
There would be two methods for providing incentives: to 
force the farmer to produce a given amount from his plot or 
else his plot would be given to another more competent person; 
to offer premiums on his share of the national income if he 
produced above a given level of yields. This level would be 
predetermined by the government in each given locality. 
3) Easy redistribution of profits. Under the system we are 
discussing, redistribution of income could be attained at 
various levels through central distribution of products and 
central planning of production processes. They would decide 
which are the most important distributing goals and they 
could direct their policy means toward those goals. 
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4. Fourth Hypothesis: Creation of Communities with Local 
Government 
A structure is suggested here as a consequence of the 
analysis of the above three hypotheses. The structure suggested 
has the characteristics outlined below through the relation­
ships of variables at the farm level. It is based on the 
creation of individual land holdings for cultivation, the 
grouping of farmers in coraraunlties or local governments and 
the help of the other governmental levels whenever it is 
necessary. Variables could be related as follows: 
I) Resources 
A) Ownership 
1) Owned by the policy maker, the Indian farmer, 
a) Land and land resources, but with restricted 
rights. They would obtain the rewards for 
the use of land resources and also of other 
capital resources they may be able to provide. 
2) Non-owned by the policy maker, 
a) Resources provided by the community as a 
form of credit unions. 
b) Extra amount of capital resources provided 
in the form of credit and extension work 
according to their needs and to countries 
convenience and need, and through other 
aggregational levels of policy-making. 
B) Class of resources 
1) Land and land resources 
a) IV and VI. 
b) Availability per family would vary according 
to the needs of the farmer through the 
year. It could increase by a redistribution 
of badly worked lands to farmers who need 
more land because of an Increase in 
resources and efficiency of cultivation. 
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2) Capital resources 
a) and b) Most important capital resources for 
production would be available through pro­
vision of the government according to the 
possibilities of the region and nation. 
3) Entrepreneurship 
a) and b) The manager would be the same farmer 
giving all the necessary time to this en­
deavor, However, his work would be improved 
by the action of the community government 
and advisors, 
4) Labor 
a) Labor would be performed by the same policy 
maker the Indian farmer would have the 
incentives of the ownership of the land 
resources. 
II) Products or Activities 
A) Direct productive activities would be planned 
according to yields, needs of the region, markets 
and better use of resources, 
B) Social overhead capital. Needed SOC could be 
performed by himself with the help of advisors to 
the extent that it concerns to his farm. However, 
if it also concern to the welfare of the community 
the members would help him perform this type of 
work, 
III) Variables affecting Physical Productivity of Resources 
A) Technology Would be increased to the best known 
techniques of the region and it would depend on the 
evolution of the community and their relation with 
the outside technology attained in the region, 
B) Incentives and motivations Would be high since 
they would obtain the marginal value productivity 
of land; they would also be helped to increase pro­
ductivity of land, labor and capital and increase 
the amount of capital they have by the action of 
the community. 
C) Structures Would not be defective since it could 
be improved by the governmental action or legisla­
tion whenever it is necessary. Land titles would be 
given to the farmer. However, if land is not is not 
efficiently cultivated for a period of years accord­
ing to minimum standards set up for the region, land 
could be expropriated and given to the community 
for redistribution. 
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IV) Variables affecting Prices 
A) Physical variables Through community action 
locatlonal attributes would be improved through the 
creation of better systems of transportation and 
communication; also storage facilities would be 
created for the protection of individual farmers, 
b) Economic variables Supply and demand variables 
would be identified by the national or regional 
authorities and prices may be controlled if needed. 
Parmer would market his products through the 
community and also would buy resources through 
this channel, 
C) Institutional variables The monopoly power of 
certain institutions would be removed through the 
cooperative organization of the community. Other 
monopolies which cannot be controlled by the 
community could be offset through regional and 
national cooperative associations and through the 
working of other policy-making levels. 
This arrangement would be formed after land is sold or 
redistributed, A given standard of efficient production would 
be set up for the area where the Ayacucho hacienda is located. 
This standard could change as time passes and could be de­
signed with the help of a cadastral system and soils mapping 
of the country. If the owners did not meet the productive 
standards, the government would have the right to redistribute 
their land. Care would be placed in letting the new owners 
have a sufficient planning horizon so that they would be sure 
about the rewards from their investment. If the farmers 
obtained a higher level of education and more capital improve­
ments permitting them to farm a bigger amount of land, under 
the fourth hypothesis, the government would be in position to 
give farmers some extra land, increasing their supply through 
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further redistribution of inefficiently operated lands. 
The flexibility of the system is very important so that 
the units would be of such a size that the operator could 
increase his productivity on an efficient scale. Transfers 
would be important and a system would be designed in which 
it would not be difficult to make them. 
a. Failure Elements 
1) The main failure element would be the relative unfeasibi-
lity of this system. Some people would be opposed to this 
system, especially the big hacienda owners. However, structures 
are means for achieving the ends of society. If these means 
are against the attainment of the ends of society, they could 
be changed. 
2 )  The freedom of people would be decreased considerably in 
relation to their property rights. They would be engaged in 
activities in a joint ownership with the government and 
inefficiencies of the government would.affect them. There 
would be conflicts between their interests and governmental 
interests. 
3) The government would need more well-trained and prepared 
people. However, it could plan a program of training to teach 
the employees to perform these activities in a future well-
balanced operation. 
4) The planning horizon of the government would be small. 
Every six years an election would change the representatives 
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and the whole government. If the new government wanted to 
change the policies, it would change all the plans of the 
previous government. Therefore, all the adjustments made 
could result in nothing. It is difficult for a democratic 
government with a regular change every six years to have a 
plan of action of this sort with a large planning horizon. 
b. Success Elements 
1) Capital would be allocated according to a given plan which 
would be adjusted to attain the ends of society in the shortest 
period. If the government received some help from inter­
national institutions through loans at low interest, this 
money could very easily be used by the government in buying 
input elements for the farm industry. 
2) Coordination and supervision could be exerted by the 
government in such a way that the lack of knowledge of tech­
nologies of the individual farm would be overcome. 
3) Incentives to work would be provided. The operator would 
know he was working for his own good on his own land. 
4), The flexibility of the unit is important. This would 
exist as explained before. 
5) Diversification could be attained if needed by the govern­
ment planning and counseling to the farmer. The patterns of 
crops could be planned in each area as well as the amount of 
each product needed in a given market. 
6) If a local government was provided, it could also work to 
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provide the community unit with highways and irrigation as 
needed in a popular action frame of work. The government 
would give tools and resources to the laborers for their more 
efficient work eind would benefit from these actions because 
it improves the Social Overhead Capital. SOC could be pro­
vided at very low prices if this system of work is adopted. 
7) The marketing ability of the unit would be greater and 
a change would be made from the poor, small and inefficient 
markets to national and more advantageous markets. If this 
change is planned and carried out by the government, there 
would be no danger of the prices going down. The marginal 
value productivity would not be decreased because of prices, 
8) Uncertainty of the outcome would be decreased because the 
government could be more certain due to the experience and 
volume of its operation than a farmer who cannot have a 
greater vision than his farm and this nearby market. 
Thus, among the four hypothesis, the fourth offers more 
success elements and combines exogenous variables in such a 
way that they may be manipulated with greater flexibility 
to attain the ends-in-view through the working of the model 
or the structural relationships of variables. 
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V. REFORM OP EXISTING STRUCTURES 
The analysis of the two case studies and the identi­
fication of the elements of success and failure of various 
alternative situations provide the partial basis for an 
understanding of the importance of an agrarian reform in 
Peru. As hypotheses coming out of the study and mainly appli­
cable to the conditions found, some suggestions are made of 
criteria for the reform of the haciendas and the constitution 
of the communities, 
A. Criteria for Reform of Existing Conditions 
The criteria for reform and creation of new units under 
the community system would be: l) priorities of affectation, 
2) cadastral system, 3) appraisal of land and other resources, 
4) system of transferences and titles, 5) system of payment, 
6) individual rights, 7) stages of creation of the new 
ownership system. 
1, Priorities of affectation 
The first criterion for starting the reform would be the 
political stability. Political stability is a factor in­
fluencing and being Influenced by economic development of a 
nation and also is one of the motivating forces for making 
the reforms. Redistribution based on the criterion of political 
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stability may have to be fast and it may not be perfect be­
cause of its urgency, lack of planning and time, but it creates 
short run stability. It is important, however, to proceed 
with very flexible commitments on this kind of reform. 
Redistribution could be improved later if the plans were 
flexible instead of definite measures. 
The second criterion is economic development. Haciendas 
would be distributed which provide greater marginal value 
productivity of the investment. This may be the case of 
absentee-owner haciendas similar to the Ayacucho hacienda. 
The new owners could increase the size of the plots they are 
cultivating at present as occurs in the Ayacucho hacienda. 
The third criterion is the applicability and economy of 
the process. The state-owned lands, the "beneficencia" lands, 
municipal land, university, and other kinds of public land 
would be more amenable to redistribution because there might 
well be less frictions between these owners and the Agrarian 
Reform Institute. The Agrarian Reform Commission Report (28) 
and the new project of law currently under discussion (35) 
place these lands for total affectation; this law would pro­
vide for transfer of this land to the Agrarian Reform 
Institute, 
The next criterion would be the redistribution by private 
initiative. This kind of redistribution might become very 
common when the reform is underway. Many people would be 
both more willing to sell their lands and to sell at lower 
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prices as reform gained momentum. Presently, there are 
transfers being initiated on lands owned by the church, 
and by some United States corporations properties. The cost 
of transferring these lands to the government would be re­
duced since owners would divide up the land among the buyers, 
following the directions of the Institute of Agrarian Reform. 
This type of reform could be encouraged by exempting private 
owners from transfer taxation if required. 
The next priority would be to redistribute well-or­
ganized haciendas which do not permit laborers to improve 
their living standards. This is especially important in the 
coastal farms. 
2. Cadastral system 
The establishment of the new units needs to be accom­
panied whenever possible by the establishment of a cadastral 
system. It would be desirable that each unit of new farms 
be registered on a cadastral system. The first areas to be 
included in the cadastral survey would be the areas where 
the redistribution starts. The maps could be drawn from 
serial photographs at suggested scales of 1:50,000 to 
1:75,000. A good description of a cadastral system is given 
by a PAO study (7). It shows the effectiveness of cadastral 
surveys as a foundation of the best management and the use 
of land needed for the improvement of human life. It states 
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the following: 
No esta fuera del alcance, ni siquiera de un 
gobierno relativamente pobre el levantar mapas 
de sus territorios y establecer un registro de 
propiedad rustica. Los gastos realizados en . 
dichos trabajos se veran corapensados con creces. 
The cost of cadastral survey according to the United 
States estimations is around 0,25 cents (u. S. dollars) per 
hectare. Less than one cent is spent for serial photographs, 
0,2 cents for the copies, and the rest for the work of the 
experts (8), The maps need not be of vertical topographic 
data. Actually, they could be only contour maps of the 
farms, not specifying even the details of the inside of the 
farms, it is advisable, however, to insert the topographic 
details or any additional information needed. It may be 
important to include ecologic and soils data, if the sur­
vey is of new lands, it is more important to stress the 
physical aspects of the new lands. If it is of cultivated 
lands, the social-economic conditions should be stressed. 
The cadastral survey will be used for determining the 
size of the new units, registering the titles in easily iden­
tifiable framework, creating the geographic units, identifying 
any change in tenure systems occurred. It would eliminate 
some of the conflicts among land owners found in Peru, 
free translation is as follows: "It is not outside 
the scope, not even of a relatively poor government to draw 
maps of its territories and establish a registration system 
of farm property. The expenditures of these types of tasks 
would be rewarded profitably." 
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especially those arising from title insecurity and unknown 
boundaries, 
3. Appraisal of land and other resources 
There is much stress on the role of land in the Peru­
vian environment. It is important to make an appraisal not 
only of land but also of other resources of the farm. The 
redistribution should avoid the flight of machinery, capital 
and other productive resources used at the farm. Appraisal 
for transference would therefore include land and other 
resources being used for farming. 
The Bolivian Agrarian Reform of 1953 and the Cuban 
Agrarian Reform legislation in i960 provided for the payment 
of land to be redistributed according to the stated value of 
the farm at the "Registre de la Propiedad Inmueble". This 
has the advantage that the law offenders (the owners who had 
their lands under-valued in the present system) would be 
punished by receiving a smaller amount of payment for their 
lands. This in a sense could be considered Justified if we 
note that by not paying taxes the owners were getting extra 
revenues at the expense of other sections of the country 
(usually the large land owners were benefited on this account 
and the low income people were the losers). 
Another method which would be suggested by economic 
theory is the appraisal according to the productivity of the 
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land. This method is difficult to apply on the sierra 
haciendas because there are not records of production for a 
period of years. In order to make it reasonable we could 
find out the value of the product at the time of the re­
distribution and appraise the property from these data. 
The inconveniencies of this method are that a farmer would 
try to cultivate his farm as best as possible the year he 
thinks his farm is going to be redistributed. Another in­
convenience might be that during the year of redistribution 
the weather would not be normal and would cause abnormal 
crops. If this method is used, it is important not to 
include the value productivity of labor within the appraised 
value of the land. 
Another method of appraisal of the land is through the 
market value. However, present value of land may be higher 
than its productivity because of capitalization of labor and 
land; the security of the Investment Justified by the lack 
of many alternatives for investment in the Peruvian economy; 
the social status of the owners of the farm, which is normally 
higher. It may be advisable to combine the above suggested 
methods to attain a just price. 
4.  System of transferences and titles 
It is suggested that land could be transferred to the 
laborers who live on a given farm. It will also be necessary 
that the owners who belonged to a redistributed farm should 
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be socially well balanced and could adjust to living in new 
society like the one which will be formed. However, it is 
more important to see if they will work for the development 
of the nation and for increasing their income. It would be 
ideal if the new titles were registered and singled out on 
a cadastral system of maps and records. 
The Agrarian Reform Institute needs a legal section 
where titles would be recorded. If necessary, the Ministry 
of Justice could also adjust operations to solve the different 
types of problems presented by the transfers. It may be 
important to wait some time before formalizing the ownership 
title of land in order to determine whether the new owner 
has fulfilled the national goals with respect to the agri­
cultural productivity. Later on, after a trial period, the 
titles would be formalized. It is important, however, that 
the new farmers have all the rights of ownership in order 
for credit to be available to them. 
5. System of payment 
It will be necessary to determine how the new owner will 
proceed in paying for his farm. Payment would be made with 
part of the farm income. This means that payment would be 
related to the crops and to the levels of living. To avoid 
complication and legal problems between the new owners and 
the old owners of the big farm, it is suggested that payment 
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could be made to the Agrarian Reform Institute. The Agrarian 
Reform Institute would in turn pay the old owner. It might 
be possible to set up a period of twenty years as the maximum 
payment period. If any new owner would like to pay faster 
he would be encouraged to do so. 
6, Individual rights 
property rights may be restricted; if a new owner does 
not work the land efficiently and does not meet the require­
ments set up for him, his land would be expropriated by the 
Institute of Agrarian Reform. It could be given to a new 
farmer who has increased his productivity and needs some extra 
leind for farming. The Indians (the new owners) should be 
tested for a given period in order to decide if they are 
working efficiently or not. However, the trial period oould 
be fairly long. 
Together with the rights of property, the new owner 
would be given the right to have a permit of water use. It 
is presently legislated that water is from the state and 
govemmentally distributed. The new owner could ask for a 
permit of water use. If there is a water shortage, this per­
mit would be regulated. Allocation of water could be made 
efficiently by the public institution responsible for its 
distribution. 
139 
B. Constitution of the Communities 
Me will outline here the characteristics and possibi­
lities of the creation of communities. The community idea 
has been advanced in order to improve some of the inefficien­
cies found in the present system of farming and also as a 
guide to follow when the farms are rearranged after affecta­
tion by Agrarian Reforms. It could be regarded as a kind of 
indigenous community either recognized or not recognized. 
However, it is different in this sense that each farmer is 
owner of the plot he is farming. The hypothesis is advanced 
that the ownership of land would give them incentives to 
increase productivity. The community with a government 
formed by a council could represent a more democratic ideal 
than a government by a leader. An example of a community 
could be Vicos even though some of the lands are farmed in 
common by all the Indians living there. 
The community's characteristics will be studied first 
by estimating its size, then its constitution and its func­
tions. Stages and steps in the creation of the communities 
follow, 
1, Size of the community unit 
The territorial area exploited within a community unit 
will be so constituted and ordered as to contain all the 
resources necessary for the group's existence. How large 
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should this group be? The economic considerations outlined 
previously, accompanied by a study on population, religious 
life, psychological environment and social organization, 
will help to determine the size of the units. 
As the size of the social aggregate increases, the 
behavior of its members changes. There is little precise 
knowledge of the relation between size of population and 
organization; yet the size of population is doubtlessly one 
of the most important limiting factors in man's collective 
life. 
In an attempt to explain the connection that exists in 
a community unit between social structure, size of population 
and land parcelled out, some characteristics have been 
studied objectively. 
The first is density of population as corrected by the 
notion of dispersion of the settlement. The distribution 
of the population over the inhabited part of the community 
accords with the layout of the habitation area, though the 
two are not identical, 
Albert Demangeon (10) has attempted to define the den­
sity of population by a coefficient K, this coefficient is 
obtained by applying the formula : 
K = E X N 
I 
in which: 
I4l  
E = population living In outlying parts 
N • total number of outlying parts 
T = total population 
K will be less than one where the settlement is compact. 
As an alternative, it is also suggested that the universal 
index be the numerical relationship between the population 
actively engaged in agriculture and the land area in the 
community. Each of these indices offers different advantages, 
which are not incompatible. The first is mainly useful in 
basic research and the second in applied economic research. 
Apart from social factors and economic factors (quantity 
of available resources, ratio between the number of producers 
and consumers), a certain minimum number of people is essential 
to assure the survival of the group. This has been called 
the "population minimum" (a number of people necessary and 
sufficient for the biological maintenance of the group). 
He has observed that if the population has less than a certain 
number of members (although its composition by age and by 
sex is determined by natural laws), it cannot constitute a 
stable and self-sufficient community. The balance between the 
sexes for the fertile age group over a period of time, con­
ditions the biological survival of the community. 
Communities and population situation have a direct 
relationship. Their functional specialization, numerical 
strength of population, sex, ration, mobility, marriage, and 
birth rates. 
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Social and economic life is always accompanied by 
corresponding religious, mythical or magical expressions. 
The religious and mythical cosmos results in ritual and 
mythical institutions and expression which often coincide with 
the limits of its population and territory. 
The "parish'" is perhaps the most characteristic example 
of the religious institutions which helps to define the 
limits of the community ujnit and the ties by which its people 
are bound. The local church and its agent, the priest, for 
example, have a highly important social, political and even 
economic part to play in the community life. Religious 
rites and secular ceremonies and celebrations often accompany 
the various manifestations of collective life and, in parti­
cular, collective work. These ceremonial expressions offer 
essential opportunities for the enjoyment of leisure. 
Communion, for religious,recreational and alimentary purposes 
plays a major part in the affirmation of the community 
psychology. Religion encourages morality and coordination 
among community members. 
Psychologically the rural community provides for each 
of its members a stable field in which choice and acquaintance 
are usually limited. A person generally knows every other 
person living within the unit. The community forms a group 
characterized by mutual acquaintance. Each person is linked 
to each other person by a bilateral relationship of immediate 
acquaintance based on personal experience. He is the center 
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of a system of mutual acquaintance. He knows of the existence 
of each of these individuals and is aware of being known, in 
the same way by all others. 
Being a specific field of sociability, the rural commu­
nity may also be considered as a cultural system made up of 
collective habits, forms of supervision, values, kinds of 
knowledge distributed by age groups, sex, family grade, etc. 
It forms a fâirly coherent and continuous terrain of 
behavior — the individual fills all these social roles, pro­
fessional, family, political, ritual, etc., in the same 
stable group. Everyone knows him in all his roles, inter­
personal relations are based on simultaneous knowledge of 
each person's attributes, both individual and deriving from 
his status (or category). 
We have to keep in mind the significance of such factors 
as the continuity of the sociological field; the conditions 
of apprenticeship and the early access of children to adult 
tasks and the adult system of values; and lastly, the frequent 
awareness of belonging to a separate community, distinct from 
"outsiders". 
2. Constitution of the community unit 
The community unit could be organized as a cooperative 
and government at the same time. The main difference from 
a cooperative is that this community unit would not have open 
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membership. The membership is to be formed by all the people 
living at the community unit. 
Suggested here is the organization of communal autnority 
in the form of a council and a manager, elected by secret 
ballot by the members of the administrative community con­
cerned. 
The manager of the community would be one of the farmers 
living within this unit. He should be elected in a democratic 
way. The electors are all the members of the unit. The 
elections would be compulsory. However, this may be difficult 
at the beginning because most Indians cannot read or write. 
A community council can carry out a number of functions. 
It may decide on the village's work and economy, bear witness 
and give Judgment, appoint 'officials' to whom it may dele­
gate its authority in part or in whole for a specific period. 
Usually the assembly consists not of all the individual 
raaatoers of the community, but only of heads of families. 
The manager and the council will be in contact with the 
various sections of the Agrarian Reform Institute at low 
levels of aggregation. What we want here is to create a 
community organization which does not now exist in Peru. 
Usually, if there is an organization of the Indians within 
the farm it has descended from the Inca Empire and reformed 
during the first days of the Spanish conquest. The Spanish 
tried to use the same organization as the Indians had but 
with Spanish leaders. This is also true on many farms in 
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the Sierra where the political authorities are named by the 
owner of the farm and not by the Indians. The Indians, there­
fore, have to learn to elect their representatives and to use 
their authority within the community unit. 
There are many types of Indian organizations within the 
hacienda system at present and the various community units 
may have their organization according to what people want. 
3. Functions of the community 
There are many important tasks that the community govern­
ment could perform in order to fulfill its purposes. We will 
mention among them the following: a) education and improve­
ment of productivity through community or collective work, 
b) cooperative associations like cooperative commodity 
marketing associations, c) cooperative sales associations, 
and d) saving and credit unions. 
a. Education and improvement of productivity through 
community or collective work The main task of the commu­
nity unit is to supplement sind to improve the work of the 
owner-operators. Absorption of the redundant labor will be 
very important and could be accomplished by a communal work 
like the construction of a school for children of the 
community. This construction would be done by the Indians 
themselves, living in the community unit during the time they 
do not work at the farm. When these Indians are not busy 
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with the main agricultural work they are idle because of the 
lack of work within the region. The community can use the 
Indians all the time with the first purpose of building this 
school. 
One study elaborates a model of a school for a geographic 
unit like the one we are describing (l6). The study is the 
application of the architectural techniques to the Indian 
conditions in such a way this school can be built without 
much help from engineers or architects. The school will not 
need to use, at least in the first years of operation, well-
trained teachers to start the job of training Indiem children. 
They will need as teachers only people with first primary 
education, because this system uses a radio and, if possible, 
television channels, for teaching Indisins. The best teachers 
and best method could be prepared at the station which brings 
the programs to the air. Radio transmission stations cover 
the sierra region. 
Indians are willing to work together in order to build 
schools at a small wage. In a farm of the sierra, for 
example, the owner proposed to provide them a teacher if they 
built a school without being paid wages. They agreed to do 
so and they were very willing to start the job. 
Foreign aid could be sought in the form of transistor 
radio receivers to be provided in the various geographic units 
formed. This type of assistance would be very productive in 
the long run and Peruvians might appreciate it more than they 
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would military aid. The transistor radios could be given 
as a grant to Peru to show the willingness and sincerity of 
more developed nations to improve productivity, standards 
of living and welfare of the Peruvian population. 
When the school is set up within the community, the 
second main task of the community would be to start other 
forms of SOC activities through collective Jobs at their 
spare time (almost one-half of the year). The work of clear­
ing, irrigating, changing the configuration of the ground, 
fencing to protect the cultivated field from cattle, and 
laying out of roads is beyond their technical potentialities. 
That is why work is so often organized on a collective 
basis. The community as such, or its specialized sub units, 
would then clear the land, decide on the division of the 
communal territory into zones to be cultivated or grared 
alternatively, organize irrigation and road building, etc. 
Group organization of work would be intended to meet the 
provision of technical efforts beyond the possibilities of 
the individual and the simultaneous pursuit of activities 
with technical requirements running counter to one another. 
This is important because many times a community is com­
pletely outside of civilization, because of the geographic 
characteristics especially the big canyons, rivers and 
mountains. 
The Indians are also willing to work for themselves and 
for their community if they are helped by the government. 
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Another help the Institute of Agrarian Reform could 
provide are tools for working on community projects. It 
could also provide food at very low levels of payment be­
cause it could be obtained through P.L. 480 U.S. The pro­
vision of tools mentioned above would create at fast rates 
a good structure of rural highways within the country and 
would also improve the marketing efficiency, productive 
efficiency and industrialization within the country. One 
of the most important contributions of the community unit 
would be this kind of activity because communally and with 
the interest of improving their situation the Indians could 
work for themselves very efficiently. 
In this way the Indians associated in the community unit 
would not be redundant laborers any more; they would start 
working on other activities than agriculture; this would 
improve their economic efficiency and could help to solve 
the problem of lack of skill for jobs other than agriculture. 
Some of these workers would eventually leave agriculture and 
work on presumably more productive jobs. 
Systematic action for the improvement and development 
of units would make desirable the creation of pilot commu­
nities to be model communities. The pilot community would 
serve as a center for modernization, collective action, 
dissemination of ideas. It would be part of a wider economic 
zone that will constitute a support and a pattern for action. 
For the purpose of putting new life into the community 
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and making it a hub of economic development, focal centers 
would have to be organized for action, education and planning. 
A theoretical distribution of those centers and their 
zones of influence worked out by Walter Christaller (9) 
suggest a schematic organization of centers, communities and 
t o w n s  f o r  a  r e g i o n  ( F i g u r e  1 5 ) .  
In every case a preliminary study would be necessary 
for the purpose of diagnosing the problems and assessing the 
needs which moderate intervention. 
This- study might be carried out exclusively by social 
scientists, but the active cooperation of the community mem­
bers in making diagnosis would be highly desirable. 
A systematic policy of training research staff and 
leaders at the local level would be the necessary complement 
of such measures. 
Cooperative associations could be formed through the 
manager of the community. He would be in contact with the 
technical help of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and he 
would receive not only advice but supervised credit at cheaper 
rates. At present the Banco Agropecuario del Peru is trying 
a new method of application for and granting of credit to 
groups of farmers. This same method could be applied to the 
group of people of the geographic unit. It would be easier 
for the bank to find an organization already set up. The 
Banco or the extension service would be related with the 
Institute. These services would advise the management of 
150 
TM EORETlCAU r>lSTR.lE.UTlON 
Qy ^ OF TOWM^ AS) SERVICE. CEMTER.S 
AWP TH LIR. "TONES OP INPLUEMCt. 
o ?-
I 
GHACiE. IToWWi AR.t ^ To S MILE'S APAR.T 
Figure 15. Various cathegories of towns as service centers 
151 
the community unit not only on the farm but also on creating 
marketing cooperative, purchasing cooperative and credit 
unions in a cooperative way. 
b. Cooperative commodity marketing association 
Another Job of the community unit would be the creation of 
a kind of cooperative for purchase of machinery, seeds and 
fertilizers, A boot about cooperatives states that the 
specific principles for the purchasing cooperatives are the 
following (l): 
1. Open membership 
2. Democratic control 
3. Dividend on purchase 
4. Limited interest on capital 
5. Political and religious neutrality 
6. cash training 
7. Promotion of education 
This list has been made from a century of cooperative 
experience. It is important to follow it if we want to form 
a good cooperative purchasing association. Of course, on 
this case, membership is not open, but in a sense is enforced 
until the Indians have attained a level of efficiency, pro­
ductivity and knowledge that permits them to remain away 
from the community unit. 
This marketing association could be part of a bigger 
association created by the Institute of Agrarian Reform for 
a regional level. 
c. Cooperative sales association The principles of 
this cooperative are the following as suggested by Bakken 
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and Schaar (1); 
1. Membership selection 
2. Function and commodity specialization 
3. Democratic representation 
4. Services at cost 
5. Savings prorated to members on a patronage basis 
6. No unusual risk assumption 
7. Attitude of non-partitionship and nonsectarianism 
8. Dissemination of information to membership 
9. Control of ownership of marketing facilities 
and institutions 
These cooperatives would be associated with other 
community units at the regional level. The association 
would be accomplished through the management of the 
community. 
d. Saving and credit union It has been found that 
Indians have a considerable amount of hoarded money. They 
need to be encouraged to save more and to use the savings 
for development. For capital formation it is important to 
save large amounts as well as the surpluses coming from the 
absorption of the redundant laborers by the industrial sector. 
This could be done in two ways: by saving and credit asso­
ciations which would force Indians or owners to save part 
of their income, or through the marketing and the sales 
association, where they can save some of their income and 
invest it in better activities. The communal type jobs are 
also considered savings and Investments for capital creation. 
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4.  Creation of the community units 
These community units would be created at the same 
time as the reform is put into effect. If some haciendas 
are redistributed, they would be organized into community 
units. Farms would be bought by owner-operators and they 
would be advised to organize the community units, giving 
them the rules for the election of the government and any 
other jobs at this level. 
The size of the communities might change with time 
because of an increase of productivity of operators. 
This would be due to the increase in the size of the 
individual farm and to the size of SOC which conditions 
the possibility of uniting separated units by roads, high­
ways and canals. It might happen that after it has been 
decided to bring a canal to a given land, two community units 
would Join and become one bigger unit. The unit of purpose 
of the people to utilize the water in the canal in a 
better way without problems would influence them to form 
only one community. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A model was developed to study the relationships 
linking various economic variables and structural arrange­
ments within sierra haciendas. The model was developed 
at both farm and community levels. The interrelationship 
among the two levels of policy-making was approached assum­
ing the operator is the policy maker at the farm level. The 
operators are grouped into communities formed by farm units 
interrelated in such a way within the hacienda that they can 
participate in the economic activities and legal relationships 
of each farm and household. The policy maker at the commu­
nity level is the person or group with power to design and 
carry out policies affecting the community. 
Using the framework set up by the model, a study was 
made of two sierra haciendas; one of them the Cuzco hacienda 
is a highly productive and mechanized farm; and the other 
the Ayacucho hacienda presents a tenure structure associated 
with a primitive agricultural system and low levels of pro­
ductivity, Both farms have in common the existence of a 
resident labor force where laborers are essentially the depen­
dents of the owner. The rented lands cultivated by Indians 
for themselves is considered farm level, and the owner's 
land, cultivated by the Indians as laborers, constitutes 
the community level. 
The analysis of the rented lands on the Cuzco hacienda 
155 
showed among other things that fifty percent of the laborers 
cultivated land for themselves. The average amount of land 
per laborer was 0,530 hectares, varying from 0,136 to 
0,702 hectare. Computed salaries to the several labor 
groups averaged S/, 8,50 for the core hacienda renters, S/, 6,07 
for the owner and S/, 7.51 for the outside laborers per day of 
work. Another conclusion includes the effect or increase 
of capital resources owned by the Indian is that 2,82 per­
cent of the income of laborers if the S/, 1,000,00 to 
S/, 2,000.00 income bracket is due to their capital resources. 
On the other hand, 79.30 percent of the income of laborers 
belonging to the S/, 10,000,00 or over income bracket is 
due to capital resources. The tenure system through 
advanced lending in amounts larger than their monthly salary 
is hypothesized to be responsible for the small plots culti­
vated by the laborers and the low level of technique and 
intensity. Under these conditions, determinant of income 
per capita is found to be the number of dependents. 
The Cuzco hacienda as a whole (community level) shows 
a dichotomy with respect to the rented and owner's lands 
which is evident with respect to yields (862 kilos per 
hectare for corn at the rented lands as against 6,000 kilos 
per hectare at the owner's land and 1,300 kilos per hectare 
for wheat at the rented lands as against 7,700 kilos per 
hectare at the owner's farm); the owner borrows money from 
the Agricultural Bank but the Indians do not; the Indians 
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total net income is an average S/. 4,947.04 while the owner's 
total net income is s/. 1,536,630.34. Besides this dichotomy 
we also find a conflict between the owner and the laborers 
about the productivity of work and salary. It shows, at 
least in this farm, that the organization of communities and 
the investment within the same community would contribute 
to its development. 
The Ayacucho hacienda uses less efficient technology and 
the conflicts of interest between the owner and Indians are 
more evident. The reason is hypothesized to be the unwilling­
ness of the Indian to work harder on the owner's land because 
he feels he is paid below his productivity. On the other 
hand, the owner does not want to rent good land to the 
Indians because he feels that the association of interest 
of Indians and owners might be the main obstacle to the 
improvement in productivity together with lack of irrigation, 
physical characteristics of land, lack of capital, lack of 
SOC, and absenteeism of the owner. 
Some remedial hypotheses are introduced for improvement 
of the situation looking at the hypothetical failure and 
success elements each may present. The main hypotheses 
introduced are (l) the creation of a single tenancy system 
where laborers could rent the owner's land, (2) the creation 
of family farms owner-operated, (3) government owned lands 
leased to the operators for them to work on, and (4) a 
system which combines the above stated hypotheses. It is 
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concluded that the fourth system emphasizing owned land but 
strong intervention, control and advice from a local and 
national government, together with a system of local and 
regional government organized as cooperatives might be the 
most desirable system. 
The model and the two hacienda cases studied provide 
a basis for advancing some suggestions for reform at farm 
and community levels. 
According to this reform of the hacienda, type of holding 
could emphasize the formation of communities and individual 
cultivators in order to provide the incentives of the 
ownership of land and to create a climate of development 
through group activity. In this system the individual would 
be given a plot of land but some limits of efficiency could 
be set up. If he is below the limit for some years then 
land could be bought by the community and redistributed among 
efficient workers. The community would also perform some 
activities to create job opportunities for unemployed people 
of the community and at the same time perform SOC outlays 
in order to improve the productivity of existing resources 
by building canals, leveling lands, building highways to 
the community, etc. Other policy-making units would help 
the individual farmers through the community which would also 
perform cooperative activities in association to some 
regional and national cooperatives. This would Increase 
farmer's capital and improve farmer's income. 
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At the farm level, a priority system for starting re­
form, the design of a cadastral survey to be used for land 
rating, title registration, tax collection were suggested 
thus avoiding conflicts. Appraisal of land resources were 
reviewed and system of transferences, payment and individual 
rights were examined. 
At the community level methods of estimating sizes of 
communities were reviewed through study of territorial area, 
social aggregate, demographic phenomena, religious and 
psychological necessities of a group of people and management 
problems. With respect to the Indians' problems, the 
constitution of communities was examined according to its 
functions, organization, relations to the non-farm commu­
nities and types of Indian organization. The main functions 
of a community were hypothesized to be the education and 
improvement in productivity through community or collective 
work, cooperative commodity marketing associations, 
cooperative sales associations and savings and credit unions. 
The creation of community units other than the hacienda type 
was also examined. 
Experience obtained during this study and the findings 
suggest the following recommendations for further studies: 
l) Much more research is required from the economic 
social, political, cultural, administrative, and techno­
logical points of view, to identify and characterize 
strategies for development. One of the major difficulties 
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experienced in the present study was the shortage of data 
and literature. This provides a challenge for universities, 
governmental agencies, sind private institutions to generate 
relevant facts and ideas through well planned research 
studies. Training research scientists for full-time re­
search and teaching jobs is a concoramitant correlative. 
The hypothesis is herein advanced that if Peru expands its 
SOC outlays, particularly for educations and research, the 
developmental policies could be formulated and applied with 
greater prospects of successful consequences, 
2) Short run and long run studies are needed to provide 
the basis for immediately correcting the most obvious de­
ficiencies in the developing process and policies to 
accelerate development in the future which would mainly 
correct the deficiencies the immediate action policies may 
bring due to the lack of information. The new Peruvian 
government is engaged in an effort to make changes and some 
actions may well be taken without strong analytical studies 
because of the strong needs for immediate action. Therefore, 
it becomes important to design very flexible short run programs 
without definite commitments in order to allow researchers 
to study fr'om an ex-ante point of view and also from an 
ex-post framework the results of the short run policies in 
relation to long run objectives. 
3) Studies at the farm level are suggested for the 
various regions of the country. The model with the exogenous 
l6o 
variables used in the present study provide strong basis 
for developing quantitative means to study structures and 
institutions. An input-output coefficient could be esti­
mated for each exogenous variable to estimate its influence 
on production which could be useful in the design of linear 
programming analysis estimation of structures and insti­
tutions . 
4) Technological research studies would give economists 
better base for estimating optimum size of farms, future 
productivity of improvements and possible systems of culti­
vation. 
5) Research at the community level from the economic 
and organizational point of view is needed. This would 
deal with savings through community credit unions, invest­
ment on social overhead capital and small transformation 
industries. The disguised unemployment problem could be 
partly solved through decentralization and action of the 
communities. Transformation of Indian communities to other 
types of more efficient groups and calculations of the 
optimum size of communities for a faster development are 
needed. 
6) In order to complement the model, research is 
suggested on the area of utility and needs of people. The 
lexicographic ordering analysis may contribute to a better 
conceptualization of future demands and the impact of some 
policies on the people in relation to stability and their 
l6l 
preference function. 
7) The model at the community level stresses the 
problem of the shortage and surplus of labor when this fac­
tor is differentiated into labor A and labor B according to 
demand's training requirements. The study could not be made 
at this level unless reliable coefficients are estimated 
for the development of meaningful input-output analysis. 
Research is needed in the areas of data collection, census 
taking and estimation. 
8) Special emphasis should be given to the evaluation 
of resources and to the estimation of indexes of production 
in order to determine resource productivities in a given 
region and the character of farms for settlement and resettle­
ment purposes. 
9) Specific research could be developed on the area of 
education using radio and television to rapidly increase the 
literacy levels. The hypothesis that education may be one 
of the main blocks to development could be further tested 
and methods to improve these conditions developed. 
10) Research is also needed in the area of public 
administration developing modem techniques and especially 
giving responsibilities to the individuals. 
11) Resource valuation differentiating labor and land 
is one of the most important phases of a reform. The present 
study has dealt with this problem in some detail through the 
study of two sierra farms; however, it is important to do 
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more research, developing means to differentiate labor 
productivity and land productivity for purposes of due 
reward to resources. 
12) The final recommendation is for encouraging re­
search on the organization and functions of IRAC to meet 
the challenge of a giant job to be done for the improvement 
of the conditions of Peruvians. 
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A P P E N D I X  
Table 1. Price index and percentage increase per year* 
1950 1951 1952 1953 195U 1955 1956 1957 3.95s 1959 i960 1961 
Price 
index 100.0 117.3% 123.77 I25.29 133.23 lHS.53 160.U1 l6g.31 ISO.9U 218.10 246.09 255.03 
Percent­
age 
increase 
per year I7.3U 1.23 10.33 7.^5 8.00 4.92 7.5O 20.5U 12.83 3.63 
a Oonqpated frcan Peru. Mlnisterio de Hacienda y Comercio (30). 
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Table 2. Gross national product, total disposable goods and services, 
and their interrelationships with public and private 
consumption and public and private investment® 
Years Total Gross Profits or Total Private Public 
disposable national losses of consump- consump- consump-
goods product current tion tion tion 
and trans-
services actions 
(Million soles in constant ig^O prices) 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
15,203.8! 
16,1417.2 
17,611.4 
18,991.3 
17.788.7 
19.7^7.2 
21,039.0 
21,690. 
21,838.6 
19.775.0 
20,505.0 
21,874.0 
15.1^.3 
15.97^7 
17,016.7 
I8,n7.3 
17,626.4 
19,257.7 
19.115.7 
20.077.8 
20,1463.3 
19.391.0 
20,848.0 
21,890.0 
).5 
594^7 
sw.o 
162.3 
1+89.5 
1.123.3 
1,612.6 
1.375.3 
384.0 
3^3.0 
16.0 
12,108.2 
12.079.5 
13,105.5 
14,486.0 
13.660.7 
14.597.0 
15.5W.5 
15.7^.1 
16,526.7 
16,204.0 
16,158,0 
16.974.0 
10,815 
10,922 
11,760 
12,936 
12,088 
13.041 
13,368 
13,640 
14,144 
13.897 
13,492 
14,196 
1.293 
1.550 
1.573 
1,556 
2,177 
2,112 
2.383 
2.778 
^Con^uted from Banco Central de Eeserva del Peru (4,5). 
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Table 2 (continued). 
Tears Pei'cent-
ag€i 
conBump-
tion is 
from to­
tal dis­
posable 
goods and 
services 
Percent­
age 
invest­
ment is 
from to­
tal dis­
posable 
goods and 
services 
Total 
gross 
invest­
ment 
Private Public 
invest- invest­
ment ment 
Percent- Percent­
age pri- age 
vate in- public 
vestment invest­
is of to- ment is 
tal gross of total 
investment gross 
invest­
ment 
(Million soles in constant 1950 prices) 
1950 79.6 20.1+ 3,096 2.76U 332 89.3 10.7 
1951 73.6 26.4 4,337 3,737 600 86.2 13.8 
1952 74.U 25.6 U,505 3,731 77^+ 82.8 17.2 
1953 76.3 23.7 U,5o6 3,640 866 80.8 19.2 
1954 76.8 23.2 U,128 3.50s 620 85.0 15.0 
1955 73.9 26.1 5,150 1,960 1,190 76.9 23.1 
1956 73.9 26.1 5,49U 4,472 1,022 81.4 18.6 
1957 72.6 27.4 5,93g U,903 1,035 82.6 17.4 
1952 75.7 2U.3 5,312 4,502 810 84.8 15.2 
1959 8I.9 18.1 3,571 3.136 435 87.8 12.2 
1960 78.8 21.2 4,31+7 3,958 389 91.1 8.9 
1961 77.6 22.1+ l+,900 4,309 591 87.9 12.1 
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Table 2 (continued). 
Years Percent- Percent- Private Public Percent­
age age sector sector 
private public in dis- in dis-
consus^- census^ posable po sable 
tion is tion is goods goods 
of to- of to- and gjid 
tal con- tal con— services services 
sunqption sumption 
age pri­
vate 
sector 
Percent­
age 
public 
sector 
(Million soles in constant 1950 prices) 
1950 89.31 10.7 13.579 1.625 89.3 10.7 
1951 85.40 1U.6 14,659 1.758 89.3 10.7 
1952 90.0 10.0 15.1491 2,120 88.0 12.0 
1953 
195U 
89.3 10.7 16,576 2.416 87.3 11.7 
88.5 11.5 15.596 2,193 87.7 12.3 
1955 89.3 10.7 17,001 2.746 86.1 13.9 
1956 86.0 ll+.o 17,8lw 3,199 84.8 15.2 
1957 86.6 ll.H 18.51+3 3,147 ?5.5 14.5 
1953 85.6 14.1+ 18,646 3,193 85.4 l4.6 
1959 85.8 14.2 17.033 2,742 86.1 13.9 
i960 83.5 16.5 17.839 3.055 87.0 13.0 
1961 83.6 16.4 19.096 3,369 87.3 12.7 
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Table 3* Gross national product by sectors 1950^ 
Total Percent- Rank of Per Hank 
S e c t o r s  W P  a g e  o f  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  p e r  
1950 prices total GNP GNP GBP capital 
1950 prices 
(million (Soles) 
soles) 
Agriculture and 
livestock 5,627 37.2 1st 2,9V! 7th 
Mining 1,635 10.8 Uth 29,50^ 2nd 
Total primary 
indofltries 7*262 US.O 
Industry service 2.199 1U.5 3rd 4,095 6th 
Service SIT 5.4 6 th 7,886 5th 
Commerce 2,472 16.3 2nd IS. 349 3rd 
Finances 251+ 1.7 Sth 34,066 let 
Other 519 3.4 7 th 2,553 gth 
Government 1,625 10.7 5th 14,909 4th 
Grand total 15.1^ 100.00 
Average - - U,9SU 
BancP Central de Reserva del Peru (U), 
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Table 1+. Censuaed population of the E^ublic of Peru and four 
selected D^aTtajnentoe® 
Population Absolute fig. 
"by races total H e l a t i v e  f i g u r e s  
Republic Total Puno Cusco Ayacucho Lima 
White and 
mestiza 3.283.360 52.39 7.51 28.15 23.84 79.49 
Indian 2,gl+7,i96 45.86 92.36 71.73 75.94 15.30 
Negroes 29,054 0.47 0.01 o.o4 0.02 1.66 
Yellow 41,945 0.68 0.05 o.o4 o.o4 3.46 
Non Declared 6,1+12 0.10 0.07 o.o4 0.16 0.09 
Totals 6,207,967 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
^ Calculated from Peru. Ministerio da Nacienda y Comercio (29, p.lUS). 
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Table 5- Mumter and size of haciendas in the district 
and their products^ 
Products^ 
Farms 
Size 
(Hectares) 
Sugar 
Cane Barley 
Potjr-
toee Corn Others 
live­
stock Alfalfa Fruit 
1 3.000 + + •V + 4 
2 2,000 + + 4 
? 1,000 4- + 4 4 
H 2,000 + 4 4 
5 1,000 + 4- + 4 4 + 
6 500 + + 
7 3.200 + •V + + 4 4 4 4 
S  Uoo + 4 4 4 
9 1.500 + *• 4 4 
10 1,000 4 •V 4 4 
11 150 + 4 
12 500 4 
13 200 + -V 4 4 4 
14 200 4 4 
1,500 + + 4 4 4 
l6 2.050 + + + + 4 4 
Total 20,200 6 13 ? I k  1? 11 2 2 
®!Data obtained from the Concejo Municipal of the Products^ capital 
of the district where the farm is located, 
products market (+) are cultivated on the farm commercially. 
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Table 6. ijnouiit and distribution of total gross income and its 
coi^onents for the Cuzco hacienda and amxex^. 
Distribution of Number of Average 
gross Income per Indian total gross 
13 month period families income 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Average 
total Income 
from crops 
(Soles) 
Average 
total income from 
personal property 
(Soles) 
Core hacienda 
I 
1,001 
2,001 
,001 
,001 
5,001 
6,001 
7.001 
8,001 
9.001 
over 
- 2,000 
- 1,000 
« 4,000 
- 5,000 
- 6,000 
- 7.000 
- 8,000 
— 9» 000 
-10,000 
-10,001 
1 
11 
8 
u 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1,413.76 
2,413.11 
3,36i.U7 
4,489.67 
5.504.82 
6,529.52 
7,524.61+ 
8,606.15 
9,556.98 
12,377.47 
555.86 
258.41 
629.90 
1,325.46 
1.371.99 
506.02 
1,438.13 
794.85 
2,554.9s 
2,073.80 
39.90 
288.55 
520.61 
1,005.75 
900.67 
3.753.00 
3,357.00 
1,090.85 
210.00 
4,314.33 
Average 38 4,947.04 882.92 1.237.25 
.Ânnez 
1,001 - 2,000 » 
2,001 — 3.000 1 2,499.00 
3.001 - 4,000 1 3.323.72 1,604.30 
4,001 — 5.000 
5,001 - 6,000 1 5.971.74 1,341.24 
6,001 « 7,000 2 6.596.34 735.99 
7,001 - 8,000 2 7,690.03 2,728.78 
8,001 - 9,000 1 8,390.92 3,660.62 
9.001 -10,000 1 9,642.00 
over -10,000 u 19,475.18 2,963.00 
1,374.00 
648.00 
3,430.00 
4,827.85 
3,100.00 
3.566.30 
9,042.00 
15,460.18 
Average 13 10,433.26 1,960.59 7,365.90 
®^Calcttlated from individual records obtained directly 
from the hacienda. 
177 
Table 6 (continued). 
Distribution of Average total Percentage from total gross income 
gross income per salary Total income Total income Total salary 
13 month period from crops from personal 
property 
(Soles) (Soles) 
Core hacienda 
1,001 - 2,000 836.00 
2,001 - 1,000 1,865.70 
3,001 - 4,000 2,209.58 
4,001 - 5,000 2,158.46 
5,001 - 6,000 3,232.17 
6,001 — 7 » 000 2,270.50 
7,001 - 8,000 2,729.51 
8,001 - 9,000 6,720.45 
9,001 -10,000 6,792.00 
over -10,001 5,989.33 
39.32 
10.70 
18. jh 
29.52 
24.92 
7.75 
19.11 
9.2U 
26.73 
16.75 
2.82 59.13 
11.96 77.31 
15.% 65.73 
22. UO Us. 07 
16.36 53.71 
3^.79 
36.27 
12.67 78.08 
2.20 71.06 
3^.85 48.38 
Average 2,857.08 I7.85 25.OO 57.I5 
Annex 
1,001 - 2,000 
2,001 - 3,000 1,125.00 54.98 45.02 
3.001 - 4,000 1,071.1+2 48.26 19.50 32.23 
4.001, - 5,000 
5.001 - 6,000 1,200.50 22.45 57.^3 20.10 
6,001 - 7,000 985.50 11.91 73.18 14.94 
7,001 - 8,000 1,861.25 35.^ 40.31 24.20 
8,001 - 9,000 1,164.00 43.62 42.50 13.87 
9.001 -10,000 600.00 93.78 6.22 
over -10,001 1,052.00 15.21 79.30 5.40 
Average 1,158.65 18.70 70.25 11.05 
Table Crop production and income from crops "by size of Indian farms, Cuzco hacienda^ 
àxea, of individual 
holdings 
(Hectares) 
Number Total area 
of per 
Indian holding 
plots 
Area 
Corn 
Production Value Area 
Wheat 
Production 
(Hectares)(Hectares) (Kilos) (Soles) (Hectares) (Kilos) 
Value 
(Soles) 
Core hacienda 
0.000 - 0.200 
0.201 - 0.1400 
O.iWl - 0.600 
0.601 - 0,800 
O.SOl - 1.000 
over - 1.000 
1 
l6 
H 
1 
2 
6 
0.136 
0.279 
0.U86 
0.67g 
0.S13 
0.702 
0.136 
0.279 
0.384 
O.5U2 
0.271 
0.702 
l't3.5S 
j.% 
59.88 
198.32 kj5. .
381.87 916.43 
957.20 2,297.28 
226.88 W.50 
615.13 1,476.53 
0.102 
0.116 
0.^ 
0.475 
80.53 
128.85 
515.42 
733.24 
175.82 
257.70 
1,030.84 
1,466.48 
Average 30 0.530 0.381 328.74 788.73 0.149 196.04 394.05 
Jgmex 
0.201 - 0.400 
0.401 - 0.600 
0.601 - 0.800 
0.801 - 1.000 
over - 1.000 
1 
2 
1 
2 
5 
0.271 
0.542 
0.610 
0.881 
1.304 
0.271 
0.407 
0.271 
0.678 
0.649 
232.86 
349.29 
232.86 
389.32 
608.01 
558.86 
838.28 
558.86 
0.136 
0.204 
0.655 
192.78 
402.67 
206.00 
791.24 
389.06 
805.43 
410.00 
1,580.01 
Average 11 0.932 0.542 453.00 1,087.35 0.390 468.77 936.69 
^Calculated from individual records obtained directly from the hacienda. 
Table 7 (continued) 
Area of individual 
holdings 
(Hectares) 
Other crops 
Value 
(Soles) 
Total inccme 
from crops 
(Soles) 
Total 
d^endents 
(Number) 
Total income 
from crops 
per capita 
(Soles) 
Core hacienda 
0,000 - 0,200 
0.201 - 0.1+00 
0.1+01 - 0.600 
0.601 - 0.800 
0.801 - 1.000 
over - 1.000 
0.0 11+3.58 
573.53 
1,092,25 
2,554.98 
1,163.00 
2,1+96.32 
2.00 
2.68 
4.25 
7.00 
4.50 
3.83 
71.79 
207.35 
615.61 
365.00 
255.20 
831.90 
Average 1,118.27 3.36 390.62 
Annex 
0.201 - 0.1+00 
0.1+01 - 0.600 
0.601 - 0.800 
0.801 - 1.000 
over - 1.000 
111.77 
270.1+7 
273.86 
288.52 
561+.I+7 
670.73 
1,^72.77 
1,637.15 
1,222.38 
3,561.50 
5.00 
5.00 
2.00 
7.00 
5.00 
13^.15 
294.55 
818.58 
174.63 
712.30 
Average 393.1s 2,317.06 5.09 495.69 
Table S. Classification of Indian workers by salary®-
Average Number Number Average Average Average Average Average Average 
salary of of work per salary monthly monthly monthly monthly 
per day Laborers Months month per per day total total debts advances 
of work Worked laborer earned discounts balance in 
cash 
(Soles) (Days) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Core hacienda 
25 - over 1 13 28.5 25.51 726.96 830.98 216.68 430.22 
20 - 24.99 - -
15 - 19.99 2 26 30.79 16.84 518.26 1244.28 950.93 118.50 
10 - ih.ss 4 50 30.12 12.66 381.81 412.95 159.33 136.99 
5 - 9.99 27 316 2U.U9 6.70 164.77 317.80 210.07 52.51 
5 - 5.99 2 26 29.91 5.6s 169.81 366.44 251.10 84.54 
6 ~ 6.99 18 212 24.21 6.57 175.31 303.23 215.05 38.14 
7 - 7.99 7 78 24.5s 7.33 177.91 341.38 188.01 8O.31 
Annex 
5 - 9.99 11 77 26.02 6.00 155.78 45.41 0.58 37.66 
5 - 5.99 1 g 27.19 5.75 156.43 4.50 2.00 
6 - 6.99 10 69 25. gg 6.02 155.72 49.50 0.64 41.22 
®'Calcalated from individual records obtained directly from the farm. 
Table 8 (continued). 
Clothes Grains Meat Alcohol 
per per per per 
month month month month 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Core hacienda 
31.15 23.85 12.96 59.20 
1+1.31 3.5^ 31.9^ 25.85 
21.15 9.2H g.36 16.62 
2U.3U 1.61 9.82 3.12 
3.35 6.93 0.91 0.21 
27.63 1.52 11.15 3.89 
21.90 O.3U 8.95 1.97 
Apnex 
1.25 o.oU 0.46 
— 2 , 5 0  
1.38 o.oU 0.25 
Average Average Miscellaneous 
cash debts per month 
payments per month 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
93.22 216.21 56.14 
199.00 925.63 78.73 
104.88 139.65 48.15 
40.89 224.64 43.14 
1.85 346.12 15.5s 
41.79 228.36 47.96 
29.36 200.73 38.62 
122.24 1.16 0.94 
151.93 
119.27 1.28 1.03 
Table 9» Total gross income per capita by number of d^endents per family8^. 
Number of Number of Total gross Total gross Total salary Total gross income per capita 
D^endents Indian 
families 
1ncome 
per capita 
income less 
salary per 
capita 
per capita Total gross 
income less 
salaiy per 
capita 
(Percentage) 
Total salary 
per capita 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Percentage) 
Core hacienda 
1 
2 
7 
g 
4 
10 
11 
5 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2,972.47 
2,028.00 
1,601.30 
1,534.82 
1,052.91 
905.39 
1,365.28 
1,027.88 
1,100.01 
817.62 
901.12 
794.92 
14.50 
3^.17 
395.00 
300.47 
1,872.46 
1,212.08 
698.18 
739.90 
1,019.41 
561.22 
970.29 
727.42 
37.01 
40.10 
56.40 
51.79 
3.27 
38.01 
28.93 
29.23 
62.99 
iii 
48.21 
96.72 
61.99 
71.07 
70.77 
Average 1.729.25 752.17 977.31 43.50 56.52 
Annex 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
4,490.52 
3,813.59 
3,696.g2 
3,630.26 
794^40 
183.3^ 95.19 
17.69 
4.81 
7 
g 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1,621.90 
1,102.04 
1,19g.70 
1.97^.39 
1,406.90 
901.54 
1,032.42 
l,g24.03 
215.00 
200.50 
166.29 
150.33 
86.74 
gl.gl 
86.13 
92.38 
13.26 
18.19 
13.87 
7.61 
Average 13 2,629.g7 2,305.98 324.05 87.68 12.32 
^Calculated from individual records obtained directly from the hacienda. 
Table 10. Mortgage history of the Cuzco hacienda® 
Date of Amount Rate of Source of Kind of Loans Date of First installment 
mortgage "borrowed interest borrowing security total Period ijnount Calculated 
per year payment returned interest 
(Soles) (Percentage) (Order) (Year) (Soles) (Soles) 
1-26-1910 8,000.00 12 Money lender Mortgage 1 12/18/1913 
7-26-1910 g,000.00 12 Money lender Mortgage 2 12/5/1910 
12-20-1913 6,000.00 10 Money lender Mortgage 3 10/21/1936 
4-9-1915 2U,000.00 12 Money lender U 9/3/1919 
12-26-1917 1^,000.00 18 Money lender Mortgage 5 9/2/1919 
6-2-1921 15,000.00 10-6 Money lender Mortgage 6 10/2/193U 7 10,500.00 10,500.00 
l|-21-192g 10,000.00 6 Money lender Mortgage 7 6/18/1936 
6-1-1931+ 78,002.00 10 Money lender Mortgage g 11/28/1936 1 39,001.50 7,800.20 
10-21-1935 30,000.00 22 Money lender Mortgage 9 12/26/1936 
1-21-1937 120,000.00 al­ Money bank Mortgage 10 10/13/1960 
II-23-I9UO 20,000.00 io Money lender Mortgage 11 U/12/19U3 1 10,000.00 2,000.00 
11-20-1957 U9U,012,00 9 B.P.A. Loan 
® Obtained from the office of Registres Publicos. Cuzco, Peru. 
Table 10 (continued). 
Date of 
mortgage 
Second Installment 
Period iJKJunt Calculated 
returned interest 
(Years) (Soles) (Soles) 
Total 
P e r i o d A m o u n t I n t e r e s t  
(Year month) (Soles) (Soles) 
1-26-1910 U-o 2,000.00 3,760.00 
7-26-1910 1-0 8,000.00 960.00 
12-20-1913 23-0 6,000.00 13,800.00 
14-9-1915 14-5 24,000.00 12,720.00 
12-26-1917 1-9 lU,000.00 U,3Uo.oo 
6-2-1921 6.0 U,500.00 1,620.00 13-0 15,000.00 12,120.00 
U-?.i-l92g 8-0 10,000.00 4,800.00 
6-I-193U 1.5 39.001.30 lo.guo.oo 2-5 78,002.00 18,740.00 
10-21-1935 1-2 30,000.00 7,700.00 
1-21-1937 23-10 120,000.00 44,200.00 
11-23-19U0 U.o 10,000.00 650.00 i-U 20,000.00 2,650.00 
11-20-1957 
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Table 11. Use of resources per hectare for each crop and allocation 
of total income; ei^teen month period^. 
1st Sugar cane period 2nd,3rd & Uth Sugar cane periods 
No.of Cost per Total No.of Cost per Total 
Units unit cost units unit cost 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Labor 612 9.00 5,503.00 612 9.00 5,508.00 
Tractor 17 SO. 00 1,360.00 -
Seeds 207 0.5U 1,125.00 -
Fertilizer - 3,000.00 - 3,000.00 
Land 1 3,306.1+9 3,306.1+9 1 3,306.1+9 3,306.1+9 
Management^ 1 15,700.51 15.700.51 1 18,185.51 18,185.51 
Total cost or 
total income 30,000.00 
- 30,000.00 
^Obtained "by calculating the records of individual crops at 
the owner's liand, Cuzco hacienda. 
Obtained as a residual from total income (total income-
other costs - management). 
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Table 11 (continued). 
Wheat Corn 
No. of 
Units 
Cost per 
unit 
(Soles) 
Total cost 
(Soles) 
No. of 
units 
Cost per 
unit 
(Soles) 
Total 
cost 
(Soles) 
Labor 165 9.00 1,465.00 175 9.00 1,575.00 
Tractor U2 80.00 3,360.00 U25 80.00 3,400.00 
Seeds 720 2.00 l.ViO.OO 250 2.50 625.00 
Fertilizer - 6,000.00 - 0.0 5,000.00 
Land 1 3,306.149 3,306.49 1 2.390.71 2.390.71 
Management 1 7,nUs.5i 7,^3.51 1 8,609.29 8,609.29 
Total cost or 
total income - 23,0^0,00 - 21,600,50 
Table 12. Days of work and salary payment to laborers coming from Core hacienda. Annex, 
Apurimac and other places January, 1961 to January, I962 (13 months)®' 
Workers* origin Number of laborers Days of work Average salaiy Total payment 
Total Average per Total Average per Total Average per Total Average 
month month month per 
month 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Male adult labor 
Core hacienda 
Annex 
Apurimac 
Other places 
620 
30U 
239 
388 
52.30 
23.00 
18.38 
29.84 
17,164.50 
7,129.50 
4,924.00 
5,136.00 
1,320.14 
548.45 
378.76 
395.07 
8.56 
6.09 
6.61 
7.51 
i46,q89.75 11,306.90 
43,462.75 3.343.28 
32,565.00 2,507.00 
38,587.25 2,968.25 
Women and 
children 
Core hacienda 
AJinex 
Apurimac 
122 
30 
28 
9.38 
2.31 
2.15 
3,135.00 
730.00 
546.00 
241.15 
56.15 
42.00 
2.86 
2.58 
2.87 
3,937.40 687.49 
1,890.00 145.38 
3.079.50 390.72 
Grand total 1,887 145.15 40,450.00 3,111.54 6.89 279,082.65 21,1+67.89 
^Calculated from individual records obtained direct'ly from the hacienda. 
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Table 13. j&yerage salary by origin of workers January, i960 to 
January, I96I (13 months)®. 
Workers * 
origin 
Average 
salary 
(Soles) 
Days of 
work 
Payment 
(Soles) 
Percentage frcm 
total payment 
Male adults 
Core hacienda 
innex 
ipurimac 
Other places 
g.50 
6.09 
6,61 
7.51 
17,164.50 
7.129.50 
4,924.00 
5,136.00 
1^6,989.75 
43,462.75 
32,565.00 
38,587.25 
56.00 
16,60 
12.4o 
14.70 
Total 7.61 34.35k 00 261,604.75 93.7^ 
Women and 
children 
Cora hacienda 
innes: 
ipurJjnac 
Othej* places 
2.85 
2.58 
2.87 
3,135.00 
730.00 
546.00 
1,685.00 
8.937.^0 
1,890.00 
1,571.00 
5,079.50 
51.14 
10.81 
8.99 
29.06 
Total 2.87 6,096.00 17.^77.90 6.26 
Totals 
Total in male 
adult units 8.60 2,032.00 17.^77.90 
Grand total in 
adult units 7.67 36,386.00 279,032.65 100.00 
Grand total 
adjusted to 
l-g years period 7.67 52,925.09 ^05,938.40 145.45 
Grand total 
per hectare 7.67 386.31 2,963.05 
«Calculated from individual records obtained directly 
from the hacienda. 
^Obtained by converting women and children figures to the 
equivalent in male adult units. 
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Table lU. Economic analysis of the owner's net Income from the 
Cutco hacienda operation I962® 
N u m b e r  I t e m s  U n i t s  
Variable costs 
1 Preparation of land, furrowing. 
seeding, etc. Tractor hours 
2 Seed Kilos 
3 Fertilizer: Guano de islas & urea Kilos 
U Weeding (by hand) Men hours 
5 Cultivation ("aporque") Tractor hours 
6 Irrigation Men hours 
7 Sugar cane cutting and processing Men Hours 
g Harvest Men hours 
9 Harvesting machine Men hours 
10 "Serquillo" Men hours 
11 Total variable costs Soles 
12 Total fixed costs Soles 
13 Total fixed and variable 
coste per hectare Soles 
lU Period of cultivation Years 
15 Adjusting coefficient to 1^ Years 
16 Total variable costs Soles 
17 Total fixed cost Soles 
Ig Total cost per 1^ year Soles 
19 Yield per Ha. adjusted to 1^ years -
20 Unit -
21 Price per unit •• 
22 Total gross income (l^ years) Soles 
23 Total gross inccsne less variable 
cost (1^ year period) Soles 
2U Total net income (1^ year period) Soles 
25 Number of hectares of cultivation 
26 Total net income for entire farm Soles 
^Calculated from detailed data of costs of operation per hectare 
per crop and other actual costs. 
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Table 1^4^ (continued). 
First sugar cane period 2nd,3nl,^th Sugar cane period 
Number No. of Value Total No. of Value Total 
units per Value units per Value 
unit unit 
(Soles) (Soles) (Soles) (Soles) 
Variable costs 
1 17 80.00 1,360.00 
2 207 O.5U 1,125.00 -
3 «- 3,000.00 - 5,000.00 
k 
K 
90 9.00 810.00 90 9.00 810.00 
Î 182 9.00 1,638.00 182 9.00 1,638.00 
7 
g 
300 9.00 2,700.00 300 9.00 2,700.00 
9 » ~.— 
10 9.00 360.00 Uo 9.00 360.00 
11 10,993.00 8,508.00 
12 3,306.149 3,306.49 
13 14,299.149 12,814.49 
lU li li 
15 1 1 
l6 - 10,993.00 8,508.00 
17 - 3,306.149 3,306.49 
18 - 14,299.00 - 12,814.49 
19 150 150 
20 % aq 
21 200.00 •• 200.00 
22 30,000.00 30,000.00 
23 - 19,007.00 - 19,492.00 
24 - 15,700.51 18,185.51 
25 32 25 
26 502,416.32 454,637.75 
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Table l4 (continued). 
Wheat 
Kumber No.of Value Total 
units per value 
univ 
(Soles) (Soles) 
Corn 
No.of Value Total 
units per value 
unit 
(Soles) (Soles) 
Variable costs 
1 ih go. 00 
2 240 2.00 
I 20 9.00 
i -
7 -g 35 9.00 
9 — 
10 -
1,120.00 
430.00 
2,000.00 
180.00 
315.00 
100.00 
15 80.00 1,200.00 
100 2.50 250.00 
- 2,000.00 
20 9.00 180.00 
2 80.00 160.00 
50 9.00 450.00 
11 
12 
13 
4,195.00 
1.102.16 
5.297.16 
4,240.00 
956.28 
5,196.2g 
l4 0.5 0.6 
15 0.3 2.5 
16 — 12,285.00 10,600.00 
17 — 3,306.49 2.390.71 
18 - 15.591.^9 12.990.71 
19 11,520 9,000 
20 kgs. kgs. 
21 2.00 — 2,4O 
22 
g 
g 
1 I 
I 
1 
23,O4O.OO 
10,4^5.00 
7,448.51 
402,219.54 
110 
21,600.00 
11,000.00 
8,609.29 
947,021.90 
